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I Introduction
"We don't hire people of your faith."' Alan Yorker, the top candidate for
a psychologist position at the United Methodist Children's Home in Decatur,
Georgia, was not only disappointed that his job interview ended with this
abrupt pronouncement about his Jewish faith-he was angry enough to file a
lawsuit.2 "'It's painful to have someone tell you they won't even interview you
for a job because of your religion,"' Yorker explained, "' [b]ut the pain becomes
greater when you realize your own taxes are supporting that discrimination." 3
If the children's home were strictly a private religious charity financed by
the United Methodist Church, there would be little question whether Yorker's
religious beliefs could disqualify him as an employee.4 Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5 religious organizations enjoy an exemption from the
Act's general prohibition of religious discrimination in employment.6 But the
United Methodist Children's Home in Decatur, Georgia, like many religiously
1. Adam Liptak, A Right to Bias is Put to the Test, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1I, 2002, at A30
(quoting Alan Yorker's recollection of what Sherri Rawsthom, supervisor at the United
Methodist Children's Home in Decatur, Georgia, told him as she ended his job interview).
2. Alan Yorker first filed a complaint with the Equal Opportunity Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the EEOC gave him the right to sue. Plaintiffs'
Complaint, para. 9, Bellmore v. United Methodist Children's Home (2002), available at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-data/LAMBDAPDF/pdf/156.pdf [hereinafter Plaintiffs'
Complaint] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Yorker was joined in his
lawsuit by Aimee Bellmore, a youth counselor who lost her job at the Decatur United Methodist
Children's Home when the directors learned she was a lesbian. Id. para. 3. Additional plaintiffs
included child welfare professionals, clergy, and the mother of a gay youth-all Georgia
taxpayers who opposed (and claimed to be injured by) the use of taxes to fund religious
discrimination and indoctrination. Id. The case settled out of court. See Alice M. Smith,
Georgia Children 's Home Settles Lawsuit; Questions Remain, UNITED METHODIST NEWS
SERVICE, at http://www.umc.org/umns (Nov. 17,2003) (discussing the outcome of the dispute)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. Felix Hoover, Case Opens Hiring-Bias Debate Again, COLUMBus DISPATCH, Nov. 15,
2002, at 01 E; see Liptak, supra note I, at A30 (quoting Yorker's claim that "[m]y money should
be used for things that are not abridging my civil rights").
4. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,330 (1987) (applying the Title VII religious employer exemption to the
secular nonprofit activities of a religious organization).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the major
federal statute regarding employment discrimination; see also infra Part iI.B (discussing Title
VII exception for religious organizations).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2000) ("This subchapter shall not apply... to a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities."); see also infra Part
II.B (discussing the Title VII exemption for religious employers).
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affiliated children's homes, receives a substantial amount of its funding from
state social service contracts. 7  Should government funding affect the
organization's exemption status?
"Tax-funded religious discrimination" s has become a rallying cry for
opponents of "charitable choice," the informal title for laws and regulations that
allow religious organizations to compete for government social service
contracts on an equal basis with other private service providers without altering
their religious character. 9 In this Note, "charitable choice" will refer to the
original charitable choice provisions Congress enacted as part of the sweeping
welfare reform legislation of 1996.10 The 1996 charitable choice provisions
applied primarily to welfare programs funded under block grants to states for
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). 1 The charitable choice
provisions direct states distributing these funds to recognize certain safeguards
protecting the religious freedom of faith-based service providers. 2  The
7. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 2, at para. 18 (asserting that the United
Methodist Children's Home received forty percent of its funding from "government payments in
connection with its care of children assigned by the State to its facility"); see also Smith, supra
note 2 (noting that "state contracts account for 57 percent of the home's operating budget"). At
the time of the settlement, more than ninety percent of the 160 youth living at the Georgia
Children's Home were wards of the state. Id. The home received a per diem amount from the
state for each child in state custody residing at the home. Id.
8. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, President Bush Puts Forward
Final Installment of Faith-Based Plan, ACLU Opposes Tax-Payer Funded Religious
Discrimination, at http://www.aclu.org (Sept. 22, 2003) (reacting to President Bush's extension
of charitable choice through administrative regulation, the ACLU found the changes to be a
",sweeping affirmation of tax-funded religion and religious discrimination"') (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, White House Launches Crusade to Promote Taxpayer-Funded Job Bias, at
http://www.au.org (June 24, 2003) (characterizing the "Bush administration's heightened
campaign to legalize religious discrimination with public funds" as "an appalling endorsement
of govemment-approved job bias") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Reverend Barry W. Lynn, Executive Director of Americans United, declared that the White
House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives handbook for religious employers
"feels more like a religious tract than sound policy analysis." Id.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a (2000) (covering services provided by charitable, religious, or
private organizations). See generally infra Part IL.A (discussing charitable choice and the Faith-
Based Initiative).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 604a (2000); see also BEN CANADA & DAVID ACKERmAN, FAITH-BASED
ORGANIZATIONS: CURtr ISSUES 3 (2003) (describing the original charitable choice
provisions).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(2) (2000) (describing the programs affected by charitable
choice). The original charitable choice provisions also applied to Supplemental Security
Income, Medicaid, and food stamps programs, to the extent that these programs contract with
private organizations. See id. (same).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d) (2000) (outlining safeguards for protecting the religious
character and freedom of participating religious organizations).
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provision addressing religious hiring freedom is the most controversial of these
protections. 13 Section 604a(f) of the charitable choice statute expressly states
that government funding does not affect a religious organization's Title VII
exemption.'
4
President Bush entered the White House in 2001 aiming to expand the
role of faith-based organizations in the delivery of social services.' 5 In his first
month in office, Bush created the Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives in the White House to facilitate faith-based participation in
government-funded welfare programs.' 6 Two months later, Representative J.C.
Watts introduced the Bush Administration's most ambitious piece of legislation
designed to expand charitable choice.' 7 The "Charitable Choice Act of 2001 ,"
Title II of the Community Solutions Act of 2001, would have extended
charitable choice protections for faith-based contractors to eight federal
program areas.' The House passed the Charitable Choice Act in July 2001,'9
but the bill had a rougher time in the Senate.20 The Senate's version of the
Community Solutions Act, called the "Charitable Aid, Recovery and
13. See IRA C. Lutu & ROBERT W. TUTITLE, GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS WITH FAITH-
BASED SERVICE PROVIDERS: THE STATE OF THE LAW 43 (2002) (stating that "[w]hether [religious
organizations] participating in service partnerships with government should be permitted in their
employment practices to favor co-religionists is among the most hotly debated topics in this
field").
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (2000) ("A religious organization's exemption provided
under section 2000e-I of this title regarding employment practices shall not be affected by its
participation in, or receipt of funds from, programs described in subsection (a)(2) of this
section.").
15. See RAM A. CNAAN, THE INVISIBLE CARING HAND: AMERICAN CONGREGATIONS AND
THE PROVISION OF WELFARE 6 (2002) (calling the Faith-Based and Community Initiative
President Bush's "key domestic policy").
16. See CANADA & ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 3-4 (outlining President Bush's Faith-
Based Initiative).
17. See Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. (2001) (providing
incentives for charitable giving by individuals and businesses, improving government delivery
of social services to needy individuals and families, and enhancing the financial security of low-
income Americans).
18. See Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. Title 11 (2001)
(expanding charitable choice provisions to the following program areas: juvenile justice,
prevention of crime, federal housing laws, the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Older
Americans Act of 1965, domestic violence intervention and prevention, hunger relief, and the
Job Access and Reverse Commute grant program); see also CANADA & ACKERMAN, supra note
10, at 4 (describing legislative attempts to extend charitable choice).
19. The House passed the Community Solutions Act of 2001 by a vote of 233 to 198. 107
Bill Tracking H.R. 7.




Empowerment Act" (CARE),2 did not address faith-based hiring rights or
extend charitable choice provisions to specific federal programs. 2 The 107th
Congress ended without a Senate vote on the CARE Act, and the scaled-back
2003 version of the bill is now in committee. 3
Although the Senate has effectively stonewalled legislative attempts to
extend charitable choice provisions, President Bush has continued to advance
his Faith-Based Initiative via executive orders and administrative policy.24 In
December 2002, President Bush issued an executive order to "expand
opportunities" for faith-based participation in a broad range of federally-finded
social service programs.25 In response, federal agencies have revised their
regulations to reflect that faith-based organizations with government contracts
retain their Title VII exemption.26
Critics of charitable choice, representing a broad range of political and
religious viewpoints 27 believe the government has opened a Pandora's Box of
constitutional evils by encouraging partnerships between religious
21. See CANADA & ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 4 (same).
22. See Charitable Aid, Recovery, and Empowerment Act of 2002, S.1924, § 801(2002)
(providing that nongovernmental service providers should not be required to alter or remove
religious artwork, charter provisions addressing religion, or religious qualifications for
membership on their governing boards). The section also notes that lack of prior experience in
government contracts should not disadvantage private organizations applying for grants. Id. As
introduced in the 108th Congress, the Senate's version of the Charitable Choice Act applied to
all "nongovernmental organizations" and did not address the right of religious organizations to
make employment decisions based on religion. Id.
23. 107 Bill Tracking S.1924; 108 Bill Tracking S.476.
24. See generally White House Office for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/govenment/fbci/(last visited Sept. 6,2004) (tracking the success of
the Bush Administration's Faith-Based Initiative) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
25. Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141 (Dec. 16, 2002) (directing federal
agencies to adopt policies that "further the national effort to expand opportunities for, and
strengthen the capacity of, faith-based and other community organizations so that they may
better meet social needs in America's communities, and to ensure the economical and efficient
administration and completion of Government contracts").
26. See The White House Special Briefing on the President's Faith-Based Initiative
Program, Fed. News Serv. (Sept. 22, 2003) (covering White House briefing with Faith-Based
Initiative Director Jim Towey, Secretary Chao of the Department of Labor, and Secretary
Martinez of Housing and Urban Development).
27. Charitable choice's critics include not only the usual civil rights groups, including the
American Civil Liberties Union and American Anti-defamation League, but also religious
organizations and leaders who worry about the negative effects of government involvement in
religion. See JOHN P. BARTowsK1 & HELEN A. REGIS, CHARrrABLE CHOICES: REUGION, RACE
AND POVERTY IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA 7-9 (2003) (discussing debates about the propriety of
faith-based initiatives).
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organizations and the government.28 Critics have voiced special concern about
the charitable choice provision that allows religious organizations receiving
government funds to retain their hiring exemption under Section 702 of Title
V11.
29
One of these vocal critics of government-funded employment
discrimination is Alan Yorker, whose lawsuit alleged that the partnership
between the Georgia Department of Human Resources and the United
Methodist Children's Home constituted government indoctrination of religion
and religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the
Georgia Constitution's Separation of Church and State Clause, and the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.3 ° Yorker and his fellow plaintiffs eventually reached a settlement
with the United Methodist Children's Home.3 The complicated legal question
of government funding and religious employment discrimination remains
unanswered, however, and it is only a matter of time before another lawsuit
challenges the statute. 2
Although plaintiffs challenging charitable choice laws will likely frame
their employment discrimination claims as First Amendment and Title VII
28. Because charitable choice involves formal relationships between government and
religion, the laws raise several questions under the Religion Clauses of the Constitution. The
answers to these questions fall outside the scope of this Note. For lengthy discussions
evaluating the constitutionality of charitable choice, see Luiu & TUTrTLE, supra note 13, at 15-
34; Carl Esbeck, Charitable Choice and the Critics, 57 N.Y.U. ANNUAL SURVEY OF AM. L. 17,
24-31(2000); Vernadette Ramirez Broyles, The Faith-Based Initiative, Charitable Choice, and
Protecting the Free Speech Rights of Faith-Based Organizations, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
315 (2003).
29. See, e.g., Andrew Mollison, House Votes to Let Religious Groups Discriminate in
Hiring; Republican Majority Pushes through Bill that Changes Job-Hiring Restrictions, SAN
MATEO COUNTY TIMES, May 9, 2003 (quoting Barney Frank, Democratic Congressman from
Massachusetts: "If you as a religious institution want to hire who you want, that's your right.
But don't ask Americans of all religions to give you tax dollars to do it with."); Laura B.
Mutterperl, Note, Employment at (God's) Will: The Constitutionality ofAntidiscrimination
Exemptions in Charitable Choice Legislation, 37 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 389, 391 (2002)
(arguing that religious organizations choosing to receive government funds alter their
constitutional status and forfeit their Title VII exemption).
30. See Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 2, at paras. 55-80 (outlining the claims for
relief).
3 1. See Settlement Agreement with the State of Georgia's Department of Human
Resources, http://www.lambdalegal.org (Nov. I1, 2003) (outlining provisions of the settlement
agreement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
32. According to Yorker's Complaint, the United Methodist Children's Home admitted
that two Jewish job applicants had filed claims of religious discrimination against the UMCH
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission prior to Yorker and Bellmore's lawsuit.
Plaintiff's Complaint, supra note 2, at para. 41.
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violations,33 they may be overlooking civil rights protections provided by state
nondiscrimination laws. Most states have their own laws prohibiting religious
discrimination, and many of these laws do not fully exempt religious
organizations.34 Even if the Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of the
charitable choice provisions, including the Title VII exemption, 35 faith-based
organizations receiving government funds may still have to comply with state
civil rights laws prohibiting religious discrimination. 36  Should religious
organizations that receive charitable choice funds remain subject to state
nondiscrimination laws? Or do the provisions of charitable choice preempt
state law and allow faith-based organizations to retain their hiring freedom,
regardless of their relationship with the state government?
No court has ruled on the preemption issue, and commentators disagree
about the preemptive effect of charitable choice laws on state employment
laws. 37 The Center for Public Justice and the Christian Legal Society, both
strong advocates for charitable choice and the Faith-Based Initiative, assert that
state nondiscrimination laws do not apply to religious employers receiving
charitable choice funds.38 Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle of the
33. See, e.g., Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Home for Children, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761
(W.D. Ky. 2001) (challenging government-funded children's home's religiously-motivated
decision to fire youth counselor because of her sexual orientation). The facts in the Pedreira
case mirrored Aimee Bellmore's experience with the United Methodist Children's Home. See
supra notes 5-7 (discussing Bellmore's lawsuit against the UMCH). Like Bellmore, Pedreira
lost her position as a counselor at the KBHC when the home learned that she was a lesbian.
Pedreira, 186 F.Supp. 2d at 762; see also Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 2, at para. 65
("UMCH acted with malice or reckless indifference towards Yorker's protected federal rights.").
34. See infra Part III.C (discussing state nondiscrimination laws).
35. This Note assumes that states are not constitutionally required to extend religious
employment discrimination exemptions to nonministerial employees; otherwise, state
nondiscrimination laws would fail regardless of preemption analysis outcome. For an argument
that the nondiscrimination exemption for religious employers is neither constitutionally required
nor constitutionally prohibited, see LuPu & TtrrLE, supra note 13, at 44 (asserting that "these
matters must be decided as legislative policy, rather than be settled in constitutional
adjudication").
36. See id. at 48 (arguing that "exemption from any portion of federal law of
nondiscrimination does NOT create exemption from state or local law").
37. See WORKING GROUP ON HUMAN NEEDS AND FAITH-BASED AND COMTY. INITIATIVES,
AGREED STATEMENT OF CURRENT LAW ON EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES, FAITH-BASED
ORGANIZATIONS, AND GOVERNMENT FUNDING §§10.1-12.1 (2003), available at
http://www.working-group.org (noting lack ofjudicial precedent or academic consensus on the
preemptive effect of charitable choice provisions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
38. See CHRISTIAN LEGAL Soc'y., AS A MATTER OF LEGISLATIVE TEXT, FEDERAL FUNDS
SUBJECT TO CHARITABLE CHOICE PREEMPT CONFLICTING STATE AND LOCAL NONDISCRIMINATION
PROCUREMENT LAWS 2-4, at www.clsnet.org/clrfPages/advocacy/cChoiceAtt4.pdf (last visited
Feb. 22, 2004) (stating that "[e]xisting Charitable Choice Law preempts state employment
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Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy disagree and direct faith-
based organizations that receive charitable choice funds to comply with state
and local employment guidelines. 39 The Working Group on Human Needs and
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, an organization representing bi-
partisan civil liberties and religious groups, aptly characterizes the preemption
question as an issue "in dispute.,
40
The preemption question is crucial to faith-based employers participating
in charitable choice programs, but as the split in opinions indicates, the answer
is not immediately apparent from the face of the 1996 statute. In addition to
highlighting important practical considerations facing faith-based
organizations, the preemption question implicates larger issues of federalism
and the interplay of federal and state laws. This Note applies traditional
doctrines of federal-state preemption law to the original charitable choice
provisions in 42 U.S.C. section 604a to determine whether faith-based
organizations receiving charitable choice funds remain subject to state
nondiscrimination laws. Part II of this Note provides a brief overview of
charitable choice and the Faith-Based Initiative, examines the Title VII
exemption for religious employers, and surveys the state nondiscrimination
laws that may affect faith-based organizations contracting with the government.
Part III examines federal preemption doctrines and anticipates how the
doctrines will apply in the charitable choice context. Part IV outlines the policy
questions Congress should consider before choosing to override state
nondiscrimination laws. Part IV also addresses the possible implications of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Locke v. Davey on different federal and
state standards regulating government funding of religious organizations. Part
V concludes that the charitable choice provisions do not preempt state laws,
with a caveat for religious organizations that receive indirect funding for
inherently religious services. Finally, this Note calls for states to provide faith-
nondiscrimination procurements rules-and local ordinances, if applicable-in order to secure
the religious autonomy of [faith-based organizations] when these providers choose to compete
for federal social service funding") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Reivew);
STANLEY W. CARLsON-THIES, CHARITABLE CHOICE FOR WELFARE & COMMUNITY SERVICES: AN
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND FEDERAL OFFICIALS 19,
www.cpjustice.org/charitablechoice/guide (last visited Feb. 22, 2004) (asserting that "state and
local nondiscrimination laws that would encroach upon a provider's religious autonomy must
give way to federal law") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Esbeck,
supra note 28, at 20-22 (arguing for preemption).
39. LuPu & TUTTLE, supra note 13, at 48-49 (disagreeing with the Center for Public
Justice's position on the preemption question).
40. WORKING GROUP ON HUMAN NEEDS AND FArrH-BASED AND COMTY. INmATIVES, supra
note 37, §§ 10.1-12.1 (analyzing competing statements about the preemptive effect of charitable
choice provisions on state and local laws).
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based specific contracts that outline how state and federal employment laws
apply to religious organizations participating in charitable choice programs.
I. Background of the Issue
A. Charitable Choice and the Faith-Based Initiative
Congress introduced charitable choice in the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Act of 1996 ' (Welfare Reform Act) to ensure that faith-
based organizations 42 could compete for and receive government social service
funding without diluting their religious character.43 The concept of private
service organizations formally contracting with the government has roots in
Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs-programs that encouraged
partnerships between nonprofit community organizations and the government. 4
In the past, religious organizations receiving government funding for their
social programs carefully separated secular services from their pervasively
sectarian institutions. 45 Groups such as Catholic Charities and Lutheran Social
Services took advantage of government funding by establishing separate
nonprofit organizations and removing religious symbols from service areas."
41. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
42. The statute refers to "religious organizations," but "faith-based organizations" (FBO)
is the more commonly used terminology. See generally LuPu & TUTrLE, supra note 13;
CANADA & ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 3. 1 use the phrases interchangeably to mean any
religious organization, faith-based organization, or congregation that receives government
funding for its social programs.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) (2000) (describing the purpose of the charitable choice
section).
44. See BARTOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 27, at 55 (tracing the origins of formal
collaborations between religious service providers and the government). Informal relationships
between the government and religious service providers go back much further. For a short
history of the role of religious organizations in American social welfare over the past four
centuries, see id. at 27-59.
45. Religious organizations receiving social services may have believed that the Religion
Clauses of the Constitution required them to take these measures. See U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHARITABLE CHOICE: FEDERAL GUIDANCE ON STATUTORY PROVISIONS
COULD IMPROVE CONSISTENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION, GAO-02-887, at I n. 1 (2002) (citing
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)); see also BARTOWSKI &
REGIS, supra note 27, at 55-56 (describing the practices of faith-based service providers such as
Catholic Charities and Lutheran Social Services); CANADA & ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 41
(listing service organizations that incorporated separately from their religious sponsors,
including the Salvation Army, United Jewish Communities, and Habitat for Humanity).
46. See BARTOWSKI & REGIS, supra note 27, at 55-56 (describing the practices of Catholic
Charities and Lutheran Social Services).
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The charitable choice provisions in the 1996 Welfare Reform Act ensure
that faith-based organizations can receive social service contracts without
taking down religious artwork, altering their internal governance, or creating
separate non-profit organizations.47 The charitable choice statute also expressly
stipulates that religious organizations maintain their Title VII exemption to use
religious criteria in hiring when they receive specified government funds.48
Charitable choice curtails the religious activities of the organizations, however,
by prohibiting direct expenditure of government funds on proselytization or
worship. 49 The statute further protects the rights of beneficiaries by requiring
states to provide alternative assistance for any beneficiary who objects to the
religious character of the service provider.50 The statute also states that
religious organizations receiving charitable choice funds cannot discriminate
against beneficiaries on the basis of religious belief or "refusal to participate in
a religious practice."51
Congress extended charitable choice to the Welfare-to-Work program in
1997,52 the Community Service Block Grants in 1998, s3 and the Substance
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grants in 2000.14 Upon taking office
in January 2001, President Bush began to push for more participation by
religious organizations in government-funded social programs,5 5 giving the
"Faith-Based and Community Initiative" an exalted position in his domestic
policy.5 6 Although Bush's legislative attempts to expand charitable choice
have not survived the Senate,5 7 he has issued four executive orders to "remove
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d)(2) (2000) (noting safeguards for religious organizations).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (2000) (providing that a religious organization's Title VII
exemption will not be affected by its receipt of government funding under the statute).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(j) (2000) (stating limits on use of funds).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(e) (2000) (outlining rights of beneficiaries to receive alternative
assistance).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(g) (2000) (requiring nondiscrimination against beneficiaries).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (2000).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 9920 (2000) (treating religious organizations as nongovernmental
providers).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 290kk-i (2000) (treating religious organizations the same as other
nonprofit private providers).
55. See CNAAN, supra note 15, at 6 (calling the Faith-Based and Community Initiative
President Bush's "key domestic policy").
56. See id. (same); CANADA & ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 3 ("President George W.
Bush has made a faith-based initiative a priority of his domestic agenda.").
57. The Community Solutions Act of 2001 would have extended charitable choice to most
of the federal government's social services programs. See CANADA & ACKERMAN, supra note
10, at 4 (describing legislative attempts to expand charitable choice). The House adopted H.R. 7
by a vote of 233-198, but the Senate's version of the bill had a rougher time. Id. A
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barriers" and "level the playing field" for faith-based organizations to seek
federal grants for their social service programs.
58
Buried within the larger Welfare Reform Act of 1996, the original
charitable choice provisions received little attention when they were passed.59
These newer initiatives to expand charitable choice, however, have sparked a
debate over the constitutionality of government-funded religious service
providers. 60 Of all the contentious issues in the debate, the right of faith-based
organizations to make employment decisions based on religion has generated
the most heated discussions.6' Alan Yorker's experience with the United
Methodist Children's Home in Georgia illustrates that "removing barriers" to
religious hiring freedom necessarily results in new barriers to employment.62
compromise version of the bill, the CARE Act of 2002 (S. 1924), did not address the religious
organization employment discrimination exemption; the 107th Congress ended without a Senate
vote on the bill. Id.
58. See White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/govemment/fbci/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2004) (outlining President
Bush's Faith-Based and Community Initiative and providing links to the executive orders) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
59. See CANADA & ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 52-53 (commenting on the lack of
legislative history addressing charitable choice).
60. CNAAN, supra note 15, at 7.
61. See IRA C. Lupu & ROBERT W. TuT LE, THE STATE OF THE LAW 2003: DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE LAW CONCERNING GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS WITH RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 19
(2003) ("Of all the issues associated with the Faith-Based Initiative, none has proved more
contentious than the freedom of [faith-based organizations] to favor coreligionists in
employment decisions.").
62. The Bush administration emphasizes that allowing faith-based organizations to retain
their Title VII exemption is not about discrimination, but rather about allowing religious groups
to choose employees who share the same faith and religious mission. See White House Special
Briefing on the President's Faith-Based Initiative, Fed. News Serv. (Sept. 22, 2003) (covering
the press briefing announcing six new federal regulations expanding charitable choice). That
allowing hiring preferences necessarily results in hiring discrimination seems like an
unavoidable fact, however. These issues came out in a recent press conference announcing new
regulations expanding the Title VII hiring exemption to religious employers contracting with the
federal government. The following exchange between Secretary Chao of the Department of
Labor and a member of the press ("Q") illustrates the confusion resulting from competing views
on the hiring exemption:
Q: Can I just follow up? But today's rule change provides federal funds to
contractors who can.., hire people based-not hire people based on their
religion?...
Sec. Chao: No, I think I made it quite clear. It removes the barriers from allowing
a organization, a faith-based organization.. . to hire someone of their own faith.
So-
Q: But isn't the actual barrier against who you choose to hire in this case whether
they are not of the same faith or perhaps in terms of sexual preference .... It's
allowing an exclusion, is it not?
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B. Title VII Hiring Exemption for Religious Organizations
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the major federal antidiscrimination
employment law that applies to private and public employers with fifteen or
more employees, contains an express, limited exemption for religious
organizations.63 The exemption, section 702 of Title VII, allows religious
organizations to make hiring decisions based on religion, but not on the other
characteristics prohibited by the act (race, color, national origin, or sex).64 The
Title VII religious discrimination exemption is not limited to employees in
ministerial positions; it applies to all employees of a nonprofit religious
organization. 5
The original Title VII exemption for religious employers in the 1964 Civil
Rights Act had a narrower scope, limiting the exemption to employment related
to "religious activities."66 In 1972 Congress deleted the qualifier "religious" in
front of "activities"; the amended exemption now applies to "its activities. In
a 1987 case interpreting the amended language, the Supreme Court applied the
amended Title VH exemption for religious employers to a nonministerial
position in the secular nonprofit arm of a religious organization. 68 In Corp. of
the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v.
Amos,69 the appellee, Arthur Mayson, worked as a building engineer at a
gymnasium owned and operated by the Latter Day Saints (LDS) Church.7 °
Although Mayson's duties were not even tangentially related to the religious
Sec. Chao: No, it's not an exclusion at all. We're removing the barriers.
Id.
63. See Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2000) (exempting religious
employers). The exemption states:
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to... a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with
the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society
of its activities.
Id.
64. See id. (containing no exemption besides religion).
65. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987) (applying the Title VII religious employer exemption to the
secular nonprofit activities of a religious organization).
66. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) (addressing the 1972
amendment).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a)(2000).





beliefs or activities of the church, Mayson lost his job when he failed to qualify
for a "temple recommend," a certificate representing standing as a participating
member of the Church.72 Mayson brought a lawsuit charging that the LDS
Church discriminated on the basis of religion in violation of section 702 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.72 When the LDS Church moved to dismiss on the
ground that section 702 exempted the Church from religious discrimination
claims, Mayson argued that if the exemption were construed to allow religious
employers to discriminate on the basis of religion in nonreligious jobs, section
702 would violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.73 The
Supreme Court disagreed.74 After examining the legislative history of the
amendment, the Court determined that Congress intended to minimize
governmental interference in the decision-making process of religious
organizations. 75  Deeming noninterference to be a legitimate legislative
purpose,76 the Court found "ample room under the Establishment Clause for
'benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without
sponsorship and without interference.' 7 Thus, Section 702 of Title VII allows
religious organizations to make hiring decisions based on religious grounds,
even when the employment is not related to the religious activities of the
organization.
Section 604a(f) of the charitable choice statute states that religious
organizations receiving government funds under specified programs retain their
Title VII hiring exemption.78 Although the Title VII exemption has not been
particularly controversial when applied to private religious organizations, some
argue that when those organizations choose to receive government funds for




74. See id. at 339-40 (reversing the district court's determination that § 702
impermissibly "entangles church and state").
75. Id. at 339.
76. Id. at 336.
77. Id. at 334 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (2000) (stating that "[a] religious organization's exemption
provided under section 2000e-1 of this title regarding employment practices shall not be
affected by its participation in, or receipt of funds from, programs described in subsection (a)(2)
of this section").
79. See, e.g., Mutterperl, supra note 29, at 425 (suggesting that when religious
organizations choose to accept government funds, they voluntarily cede a degree of
organizational independence). According to Mutterperl's analysis, "The Title VII exemption
that is permissible in the private sector is no longer permissible in the charitable choice
context." Id. at 426.
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charitable choice rail against what they perceive to be government-funded
religious discrimination. 80
The rhetoric sounds persuasive, but the position is probably not legally
defensible under Title VII. The exemption for religious organizations appears
to apply regardless of whether the organization receives government funding.
The statute does not speak to the relationship between the religious
organization and the government, and lower courts have ruled that government
funding simply does not affect a religious organization's status under Title
VII. 8 1 In Hall v. Baptist Memorial Health Care Corp. ,82 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Baptist Memorial College
80. Many critics of the fusion between government funds and the religious hiring
preferences are religious organizations. For example, Reverend Randy Day, chief executive of
the United Methodist Board of Global Ministries, issued a press statement in response to the
House of Representatives adoption of a job-training act that included the charitable choice
hiring exemption for religious organizations. See Senate Should Ban Discrimination in Hiring,
Church Exec Says, UNITED METHODIST NEWS SERVICE (May 23, 2003), available at
www.umc.org/umns/news_archive2003 (discussing the Church's position on government funds
and social service contracts) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Day stated
that the United Methodist Church's official policy required that "'Skill, competence, and
integrity in the performance of duties shall be the principle consideration in the employment of
personnel and shall not be superceded by any requirement of religious affiliation."' Id. He
expounded on this position:
I offer this tried and true open hiring policy as a model to any faith-based
organization that is serious about the delivery of publicly funded services to the
public. Religion has no business accepting government money to foster its own
private interests, important as those may be; and government has no business
offering money to religious groups with the suggestion that they may use it in ways
that discriminate among clients and/or staff.
Id. Day's attack on religious hiring preferences starkly contrasts with the employment practices
of the United Methodist Children's Home in Alan Yorker's case. See supra notes 2, 7, and
accompanying text (describing hiring discrimination at the children's home).
81. See Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2000)
(finding religious organization did not waive its statutory exemptions under Title VII because it
received federal funds).
82. Id. Baptist Memorial College terminated plaintiff Glynda Hall's position as a Student
Services Specialist after learning that Hall had been ordained as a lay minister at Holy Trinity
Community Church, a nondenominational church that believes homosexuality is not
incompatible with Christianity. Id. at 622-23. The Southern Baptist Convention, the college's
religious affiliate, formally views homosexuality as "an abomination in the eyes of God." Id.
The college felt that Hall's views on homosexuality thus created a "conflict of interest" and
disqualified her for her position of influence over the students. Id. at 623. Hall's subsequent
complaint, alleging employment discrimination on the basis of religion, was dismissed on
summaryjudgment by the district court. Id. She appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which found that
the district court had not erred in finding that the college was entitled to a religious exemption,
that the college had not waived its Title VII exemption, and that Hall did not state a prima facie
case of religious discrimination. Id. at 623-27.
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of Health Sciences did not waive its Title VII exemption from religious
discrimination claims when it accepted federal funds.8 3 The Sixth Circuit
reasoned that religious organizations could never waive Title VII exemptions
because they "reflect a decision by Congress that religious organizations have a
constitutional right to be free from governmental intervention. "84 Contrary to
the Sixth Circuit's intimation, the Supreme Court has never held that a religious
organization has a constitutional right to discriminate in any job position.85
Even without a constitutional mandate, however, the language of Title VII
suggests that the exemption is absolute for employers who fall within the
statute's broad category of "religious entities."8 6  Following the line of
reasoning in Amos and Hall, faith-based organizations that receive government
funding under the charitable choice statute most likely can discriminate on
religious grounds for any position without violating Title VII or jeopardizing
their eligibility for federal funds.
C. State Nondiscrimination Laws
Although Title VII does not address government funding of religious
groups, many states and municipalities have their own laws prohibiting
_,overnment-funded religious discrimination. 7 According to a report from the
Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy, forty-six states have laws
prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of religion.88 All but three
83. Id. at 625.
84. Id.
85. Cf Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (evaluating Title VII exemption for religious nonprofit
organizations). In Amos, the plaintiff argued that the pre-1972 exemption for religious
organizations-which limited the exemption to employees carrying out religious activities-was
adequate under the Constitution. Id. The Court assumed "for the sake of argument that the pre-
1972 exemption was adequate in the sense that the Free Exercise Clause required no more." Id.
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (a) (2000) (providing an exemption for religious employers).
The statute states that the prohibitions against religious discrimination are inapplicable to
employees of religious entities, which the statute defines as "a religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities." Id.
87. See Lutu & TurrLE, supra note 13, at 47-48 (surveying state and local
antidiscrimination laws that might apply in the charitable choice context).
88. Id. at 47. Appendix B of the Lupu and Tuttle report provides a "State-by-State
Summary of Religious Exemption Statutes," showing which states have employment
discrimination statutes, whether religious organizations are exempted, what happens to the
exemption if a religious organization contracts with the government, and whether any cases
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of those states provide an exemption for religious employers,89 but the
exemptions vary and may not apply to faith-based organizations that receive
state funds. For example, eighteen states currently have laws stating that
religious organizations contracting with the government waive their exemption
from state nondiscrimination law.90 Another set of state laws limits the
exemption to "the purpose of carrying on... religious activitiesi 9l or "to
promote... religious principles.p92 Because the charitable choice statute
prohibits the expenditure of government funds on "sectarian worship,
instruction, or proselytization," 93 faith-based organizations may surrender their
hiring freedom in states with limited, ministerial-type exemptions.
94
interpret the exemption statutes. Id. at 131-70.
89. Id. North Dakota has no stated exemption for religious organizations, but the Lupu
and Tuttle report cites the state's Attorney General as saying that "absent evidence of legislative
intent to the contrary they would probably follow federal example." Id. at 158. West Virginia
has no exemption for religious employers, and there are no cases interpreting the statute. Id. at
168.
Ohio is the third state without an exemption, although "according to the State Equal
Opportunity Department, the Civil Rights Comm. would take into account 'factors that could
violate or infringe upon the First Amendment protection of freedom of religion' when
evaluating a discrimination claim." Id. at 159. The Ohio appellate court affirmed that the state
lacked a blanket religious employer exemption in Ward v. Hengle, 706 N.E.2d 392, 395 (Ohio
App. 1997), finding that Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02 prohibited religious discrimination
and did not exempt religious organizations. Id. In that case, plaintiff Brother Gabriel Ward
belonged to a community of monks not officially recognized by the Roman Catholic Church and
held a clerical position at Our Lady of Victory Church in Cleveland. Id. at 394. Defendant
Father Hengle informed Ward that he would have to stop dressing as a monk and using the title
"Brother" while at work because the practices conflicted with church doctrine. Id. Ward
refused to comply with Hengle's request, and Our Lady consequently fired Ward. Id. Brother
Ward brought a lawsuit claiming that Father Hengle and the church had violated federal and
state law by discharging him on the basis of religion. Id. The trial jury awarded Ward damages
based on its finding that the church had violated both federal and state law. Id. The church
appealed the verdict, and the Ohio Appellate Court found that the trial court had erred in ruling
that the church had violated federal law because the church was exempt from liability based on
Title Vii's exemption for religious employers. Id. at 395. However, the court ruled that the
error was harmless, and affirmed the trial court's verdict based on Ohio's state
antidiscrimination law. Id. The court noted that although the state courts often looked to cases
interpreting Title VII for guidance, the state legislature demonstrated a clear intent that religious
organizations should fall within the ambit of the state's antidiscrimination statute. Id. at 396.
The court further stated that the state antidiscrimination law did not violate the First
Amendment because it required only a minimal inquiry into church doctrine to recognize the
dispute between Ward and the church. Id.
90.- Luvu & TUTTLE, supra note 13, at 47-48.
91. Id. at 145 (citing Kentucky law).
92. Id. at 148 (citing Massachusetts law).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(j) (2000) (outlining limits on the use of government funds).
94. See McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 852-53 (Minn. 1985)
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Additionally, most major cities also have their own laws forbidding all
organizations contracting with the city from exercising religious hiring
preferences. 95
With so much variation in federal, state, and local employment law, not to
mention the confusion inherent in church-state relationships, it is not surprising
that states and faith-based organizations are implementing charitable choice
inconsistently. A 2002 report from the United States General Accounting
Office (GAO) noted that some state, local, and faith-based organization
officials were unaware of the religious employer exception to federal
discrimination law, and that a number of the state and local officials who were
aware of the exception nevertheless believed it "to be in conflict with local
antidiscrimination laws."96 Despite efforts in many states to create agencies or
to appoint liaisons to facilitate the implementation of charitable choice,97 the
GAO study found that "few local and [faith-based organization officials] we
interviewed recalled receiving any guidance on the safeguards, informal or
otherwise, from state or local officials, respectively. "98
The lack of clear guidelines in state social service contracts exacerbates
this confusion. Currently, many state contracts for funding have employment
discrimination provisions that require compliance with "federal and state law,"
and some contracts explicitly forbid religious discrimination and do not exempt
religious organizations.99 Because the language was not drafted with charitable
choice and faith-based service providers in mind, the contracts confuse
(deciding that the managers of a health club with a Christian mission could not discriminate on
the basis of religion).
95. See LuPu & TUTrLE, supra note 13, at 48 (commenting on the prevalence of
municipal ordinances forbidding contractors with the city to discriminate on the basis of
religion).
96. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHARITABLE CHOICE: FEDERAL GUIDANCE ON
STATUTORY PROvIsIONs COULD IMPROVE CONSISTENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION, GAO-02-887, at 20
(2002).
97. See id. at 17 (discussing the steps taken by different states to promote faith-based
organization); see also CANADA & ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 6 n. 15 (naming fifteen states
with official liaisons to improve communication and collaboration between the government and
faith-based organizations). The nonexhaustive list includes Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia. Id.
98. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHARITABLE CHOICE: FEDERAL GUIDANCE ON
STATUTORY PROVISION COULD IMPROVE CONSISTENCY OF IMPLEMENTATION, GAO-02-887, at 21
(2002).
99. See Lui'u & TUTTLE, supra note 13, at 71 ("With a few notable exceptions, the
existing contracts between states and FBOs are conspicuously silent on the subject of the
particular rights and responsibilities that attach to FBOs in such contracts.").
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religious organizations.1°° Faith-based organizations have access to information
about charitable choice and federal laws.'0 ' When it comes to state law,
however, faith-based organizations are encouraged to consult an attorney to
navigate the complicated questions about state laws and religious hiring
freedom.'0 2
The White House offers a solution to the confusion: simply permit faith-
based organizations to retain religious hiring freedom.10 3 Because the different
patterns of exemptions in federal and state law have created a "patchwork quilt
of conflicting approaches," the White House advocates changing conflicting
federal standards to create a uniform federal exemption for religious
organizations. '4 At the state level, however, "the President will urge the courts
to provide guidance on whether faith-based organizations are required to
comply with state and local ordinances that restrict their ability to participate in
Federally funded formula and block grant programs.' 0 5 President Bush has
turned to the courts for guidance on the relationship between state and federal
law, but the courts will look to Congress to determine whether charitable choice
displaces state nondiscrimination statutes. Preemption is largely a question of
congressional intent, ,06 and as the Supreme Court has noted, "the courts should
not assume the role which our system assigns to Congress."'
10 7
100. See JOHN C. GREEN & AMY L. SHERMAN, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY; FRUITFUL
COLLABORATIONS: A SURVEY OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED FAITH-BASED PROGRAMS IN 15 STATES
7, at http://hudsonfaithincommunities.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2004) (noting that "[a]wareness
of the charitable choice guidelines by [faith-based organizations] is less than ideal and only
about half of the contracts written with the [faith-based organizations] actually include the
specific language of the guidelines") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
101. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE FAITH-BASED AND CMTY. INITIATIVES, GUIDANCE TO FAITH-
BASED AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS ON PARTNERING WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/govemment/fbci/guidance_document.pdf (last visited Feb. 22,
2004) (providing religious organizations advice on federal charitable choice law) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
102. See id. at 13 (encouraging religious organizations to consult an attorney to find out
more about specific requirement applying to their organizations, as well as their rights under the
Constitution and federal law).
103. See WHITE HOUSE FAITH-BASED AND CMTY. INITIATIVES, PROTECTING THE CIVIL
RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY OF FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS: WHY RELIGIOUS HIRING
RIGHTS MUST BE PRESERVED 7, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/govemment/fbci/booklet.pdf
(last visited Feb. 22, 2004) (noting that "[i]t is simply too difficult and costly for many faith-
based organizations to navigate these uncertain regulatory waters") (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
104. Id. (discussing need for uniform federal exemption).
105. See id. at 7-8 (explaining the Bush administration's position on religious hiring rights
with respect to federal and state law).
106. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994) (stating that
"[wlhether federal law pre-empts a state law establishing a cause of action is a question of
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I1 Federal-State Preemption Law
A. An Overview of the Preemption Paradigm
The question of whether state nondiscrimination laws apply in light of
charitable choice implicates important issues of state sovereignty,
federalism, and the doctrine of preemption, perhaps the "most frequently
used doctrine of constitutional law in practice."10 8  When evaluating
preemption cases, the Supreme Court uses a standard framework for
preemption that is easy to summarize but difficult to apply.' °9 In brief, the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause grants Congress the power to displace
state laws in any area where Congress has the power to regulate." 0
However, the Court recognizes a presumption against preemption when
states are regulating in their traditional areas of authority. "' Congress may
expressly exercise its powers to preempt by including a preemption clause
in the statute." 2 If Congress does not specifically address preemption in
the statute, it may implicitly achieve the same effect by occupying a field of
regulation so completely that it leaves no room for the states to supplement
it"13 or by passing legislation that conflicts with state law." 4  When
deciding whether state and federal laws conflict, the Court will first
consider the respective legislative purposes reflected by the statutes and
then determine whether compliance with both federal and state law would
be actually or legally impossible." 5 Finally, the Court will ask the broader
congressional intent"); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604 (1991)(stating that
"[t]he ways in which federal law may pre-empt state law are well established and in the first
instance turn on congressional intent").
107. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n., 461
U.S. 190, 223 (1983) (finding that Congress intended for the states to regulate the development
of nuclear power).
108. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767,768
(1994) (discussing the relevance of preemption to constitutional law scholarship).
109. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 232 (2000) (calling modem
preemption jurisprudence a "muddle").
110. See U.S. CONST art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
Ill. See infra Part II1.B (discussing presumption against preemption).
112. See infra Part III.C (discussing express preemption).
113. See infra Part III.C.I (discussing field preemption).
114. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing conflict preemption).
115. See infra Part III.C.2 (same).
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question of whether the state law acts as an impermissible obstacle to
achieving the full purpose of the federal statute.116
Courts will likely apply this paradigm to a charitable choice
preemption challenge. Predicting where the paradigm will lead jurists is
more difficult to predict; the Supreme Court's preemption cases have
created an enigmatic set of precedents. 1 7 As Professor Caleb Nelson
observed, "Most commentators who write about preemption agree on at
least one thing: Modem preemption jurisprudence is a muddle.""' 8
Working through the muddle, however, yields an indication of how courts
should evaluate the charitable choice preemption question.
B. Presumption Against Preemption
The Supreme Court has routinely recognized a presumption against
preemption, especially when the states are regulating in an area
traditionally under their authority.' 9 The presumption requires that courts
"start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." 120 Furthermore, the presumption "provides
assurance that 'the federal-state balance' . . . will not be disturbed
unintentionally.., by the courts., 121 Following this line of reasoning,
courts should apply the presumption when determining whether the
charitable choice statute overrides state nondiscrimination laws because the
nondiscrimination laws flow from the states' police powers. 122 The states
have traditionally enjoyed broad authority under their police powers to
regulate all aspects of the employment relationship-including
discrimination-to protect workers within the state.
123
116. See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing obstacle conflict preemption).
117. See Nelson, supra note 109, at 232-33 (commenting on the confusion surrounding
recent preemption jurisprudence).
118. Id. at 232.
119. See, e.g., Wis. Pub. Intervener v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991)(finding that the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act did not preempt municipal ordinances
regulating the use of pesticide).
120. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
121. See Jones v. Rath Packing, Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (finding that federal
labeling and packaging laws preempted conflicting state standards).
122. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724,756 (1985) (emphasizing state police
power authority to regulate employment law).
123. See id. (same); see also Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States:
Preemption and the Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American
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In his dissenting opinion in Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Association,124 a 1992 case dealing with the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, Justice Souter argued that the preemption analysis
should- begin with the presumption against displacing state law.' 2 5 He
asserted, "If the statute's terms can be read sensibly not to have a pre-
emptive effect, the presumption controls and no pre-emption may be
inferred." 26 If Souter's characterization of the presumption were accurate,
a state nondiscrimination law would easily escape a preemption challenge
in a charitable choice lawsuit. One could sensibly construe the provisions
of 42 U.S.C. Section 604a to preserve the status quo regarding federal and
state employment law. The statute could serve to protect the religious
character of faith-based organizations and to prevent states from
discriminating against faith-based service providers without requiring the
preemption of state employment laws. 127 Of course, this reading is not the
only possible construction of the statute, 12 but it is sensible and avoids
preemption.
Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 469, 537-41 (1993) (characterizing employment law as falling
under state police power).
124. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992). In Gade, the Court
evaluated the preemptive effect of federal safety and health standards promulgated under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) on Illinois state laws regulating training for
workers who handled hazardous waste. Id. at 91-92. The plaintiff, National Solid Wastes
Management Association, sought to enjoin the enforcement of the state standards, which
required the Association to take measures beyond those required by OSHA. Id. at 93-94. The
United States District Court held that OSHA did not preempt the state laws because they were
enacted with a purpose other than promoting job safety-namely, protecting the environment
and general public safety. Id. at 94. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and concluded that
OSHA preempted all state regulations that constituted health and safety regulation of workers.
!d. at 95. In a five-four opinion, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that OSHA
preempted the state regulations. Id. at 109. Four justices applied the implied preemption
doctrine to find that the state regulations impermissibly conflicted with the purpose of OSHA.
Id. at 100-08. Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion arguing that the state laws
did not "actually conflict" with OSHA to the degree required by the Court's preemption
standards. Id. at 1 10. Kennedy instead relied on the express preemption language in OSHA to
displace the state safety regulations. Id. at 109.
125. See id. at 116 (stating that "[a]nalysis begins with the presumption that 'Congress did
not intend to displace state law'").
126. Id. at 116-17.
127. Cf. Lupu & TurrTLE, supra note 13, at 49 (arguing that the charitable safeguards for
"religious character" and "independence from federal, state, and local governments" cannot be
interpreted to preempt state antidiscrimination laws; rather, the provisions serve the "overall
purpose of Charitable Choice legislation, which is to end categorical discrimination against
[faith-based organizations] in the award of such contracts").
128. Cf CHmusTiAN LEGAL Soc'y, supra note 38, at 2-4 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 604a to
require preemption of state nondiscrimination laws if they encroach on the religious liberty of
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The presumption will probably not settle the question, however-at least
not at the outset of the preemption analysis. Justice Souter's characterization
of the presumption against preemption does not comport with the Court's
recent preemption decisions. 129  In practice, the presumption does not
consistently temper the Court's interpretation of statutes.' 30 Indeed, several
scholars have commented that the Court's usual recitation of the presumption
against preemption is all but meaningless.' 3
Consider, for example, Egelhoffv. Egelhoff 132 In this 2001 preemption
case, the Supreme Court concluded that the Employment Retirement Income
faith-based service providers); CALSON-THMES, supra note 38, at 9, 19 (same); Esbeck, supra
note 28, at 20-22 (same).
129. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001) (glossing over the
presumption against preemption). See generally Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861
(2000) (failing to address the presumption against preemption).
130. See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 151 (glossing over the presumption against preemption).
131. See, e.g., Calvin Massey, Federal Jurisprudence, State Autonomy: "Joltin 'Joe has
Left and Gone Away": The Vanishing Presumption Against Preemption, 66 ALB. L. REv. 759,
759 (2003) (surmising that the Supreme Court's regular reference to the presumption against
preemption "is devoid of force and no longer even hortatory"); Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Study in
Judicial Sleight of Hand: Did Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Eradicate the Presumption
Against Preemption?, 17 BYU J. Put. L. 1, 2-3 (2002) ("In fact, in numerous statements that
reveal its approach, the Court evidences a predisposition toward preemption rather than a
presumption against it .... "); Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of
Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REv. 967, 1013 (2002) ("[Tjhere is no meaningful presumption against
preemption.").
132. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001). During their marriage, David Egelhoff
designated Donna Egelhoff as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy and pension plan, both
governed by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Id. at 144.
The Egelhoffs divorced, and two months later David Egelhoff died intestate. Id. Because
Donna Egelhoff remained the listed beneficiary for her former husband's insurance policy, she
received the proceeds under the policy. Id. David's children from a previous marriage sued
Donna for the proceeds under Washington state law, which provided that a divorce revokes the
designation of the decedent's former spouse as the beneficiary for nonprobate assets, including
life insurance policies and pension plans. Id. The children argued that because the state statute
disqualified Donna as a beneficiary, they were entitled to the proceeds from their father's
policies. Id. at 145. The trial court decided that the policy proceeds "'should be administered in
accordance with ERISA'" and ruled in favor of Donna. Id. at 145. The Washington Court of
Appeals reversed, concluding that ERISA did not preempt the state statute. Id. The Supreme
Court of Washington affirmed, noting that the Washington statute lacked a "'connection with'
an ERISA plan that would compel pre-emption." Id. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, and
found that ERISA preempted the state statute. Id. at 147. The U.S. Supreme Court's rationale
turned on the fact that the goal of ERISA was to create nationally uniform plan administration,
and the Washington statute posed an impernissible threat to that goal. Id. at 148. The Court
also relied on ERISA's preemption clause, which stated that the Act supercedes "any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by
ERISA. Id. at 146. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented, and took issue with the
majority's interpretation of the preemption clause. 1d. at 153-54 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) displaced a Washington statute providing that
a divorce automatically revokes the designation of a spouse as a beneficiary in a
life insurance plan.133 Because the Washington statute regulated family property
law, an area of law traditionally governed by the states, the presumption against
preemption should have shaped the Court's interpretation of the state and federal
statutes. 34 In his dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the Court could have read the
state law to supplement ERISA, thereby honoring the presumption against
preemption.' 35 Justice Thomas's majority opinion took note of the presumption
against preemption, but he quickly dismissed the presumption in light of Congress's
"clear" intent to preempt state law.' 36 The majority's casual treatment of the
presumption in Egelhoff prompted Professor Calvin Massey to lament, "If the
national motto 'In God We Trust' is a 'ceremonial deism,' the presumption against
preemption is a ceremonial federalism."'
137
Massey's characterization may overstate the declining value of the
presumption. As long as the Court continues to acknowledge the presumption
against preemption in its opinions, the presumption may yet prove conclusive in
close cases.138 Because the charitable choice statute presents a difficult preemption
challenge, the presumption could be the deciding factor in determining whether the
federal provisions override state laws. The Supreme Court's recent applications of
the presumption, however, indicate that the Court will not allow the presumption to
solve the question at the outset of the preemption analysis. The Court will first
evaluate the charitable choice statute and state nondiscrimination laws under the
other preemption doctrines.
Justice Breyer argued that the ERISA preemption clause did not lead to the conclusion that the
Act preempted all state laws governing inheritance; he asserted that the Washington statute did
not conflict with ERISA-it simply "fill[ed] in the gaps" of the plan regarding what happens
when a beneficiary designation is invalid. Id. at 156 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 143.
134. See id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]n answering [the preemption
question], we must remember that petitioner has to overcome a strong presumption against
preemption. That is because the Washington statute governs family property law-a 'field of
traditional state regulation'....").
135. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).
136. See id. at 151 (finding that the presumption can be overcome when Congress clearly
expresses its intent to preempt state law).
137. Massey, supra note 131, at 759.
138. But see Raeker-Jordan, supra note 131, at 43 (stating that "[p]erhaps the most that one
can say is that the presumption exists in name only; otherwise, its applicability and even the
acknowledgment of its existence are dependent on the whims of the Court and the Court's
desired outcome in any particular case").
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C. Congressional Intent and Implied Preemption
39Congressional intent is the touchstone of the preemption inquiry.'
When determining congressional intent, courts first turn to the language,
structure, and purpose of the statute.'40 Even when Congress includes a
clause expressly addressing preemption, as it did in ERISA,14 , questions
remain about the extent to which Congress intended to displace state law. 1
42
In the charitable choice statute, however, Congress included no clause
expressly preempting state law. 43 Thus, courts will look to the implied
preemption doctrines to discern Congress's intent. The Supreme Court has
recognized two general ways Congress may implicitly override state law-
field preemption and conflict preemption.'44
139. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246,252 (1994) ("Whether federal law
pre-empts a state law establishing a cause of action is a question of congressional intent."); Wis.
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604 (199 1) ("The ways in which federal law may pre-
empt state law are well established and in the first instance turn on congressional intent.").
140. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n., 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (applying
preemption analysis to determine that state laws must yield when they interfere with the federal
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (stating that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by the
Act).
142. See, e.g., Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting uncertainty about what exactly "triggers the 'relate to' provision" of the ERISA
preemption section).
143. The charitable choice statute does contain a clause addressing preemption, but it is
actually a savings clause preserving state law. Section 604a(k) states: "Nothing in this section
shall be construed to preempt any provision of a State constitution or State statute that prohibits
or restricts the expenditure of State funds in or by religious organizations." 42 U.S.C. § 604a(k)
(2000). Although the legislative history does not provide any information about the purpose of
this clause, it is likely intended to address the thirty-seven state constitutional provisions and
amendments that restrict the flow of state funds to religious organizations. The Roundtable on
Religion and Social Welfare Policy, Roundtable Research Page on Locke v. Davey, at
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org (Dec. 2, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). The Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of the State of
Washington constitutional provision that prohibits the flow of government funds to religious
institutions. See Locke v. Davey, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1315 (2004) (stating that nothing in the state
law demonstrated an animus toward religion).
144. See, e.g., Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (noting that absent express preemption language, the
Court has recognized the doctrines of field and conflict preemption).
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1. Field Preemption and the Title VII Exemption
Congress may choose to regulate a field of law so completely that state
authority is necessarily preempted.145 Congress may occupy the field by
passing legislation in an area where the federal interest is so superior to the
state interest that the federal law overrides any state laws touching on the
same subject. For example, in a 1941 preemption case 146 the Supreme
Court found that the federal government's supremacy in the general field of
foreign affairs superseded a state's interest in regulating aliens within its
borders, and therefore Congress's comprehensive plan for alien registration
preempted more restrictive state registration laws. 147 Similarly, Congress
may occupy a field of law by passing legislation that regulates a field so
pervasively that it "leaves no room for the states to supplement it.' 148 The
Nuclear Energy Act, for example, illustrates Congress's intent to regulate
the field of nuclear safety concerns except for limited powers expressly
retained by the states.' 49  The Supreme Court determined in a 1983
preemption case that Congress intended for the federal government to
maintain "complete control of the safety and 'nuclear' aspects of energy
generation," while allowing states to retain their traditional authority over
the general regulation of energy production.150
Neither type of field preemption applies to the charitable choice
dilemma. Congress has not expressed the intention to occupy the field of
law addressing social service contracts or governing the relationship
between religious service providers and the state. In fact, welfare programs
are largely a matter of state concern.15  As welfare policy researchers
noted, the 1996 reforms to TANF "expressed a theory of federalism, in
which states were given flexibility in designing policies and dealing with
145. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (outlining various
ways Congress may preempt state laws).
146. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
147. Id. at 74. In Hines, field preemption informed the Court's decision that
Pennsylvania's act conflicts with the federal scheme. Id. The case stands for the fact that the
categories of preemption are not discrete.
148. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
149. See Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation and Dev. Comm'n., 461
U.S. 190, 212-13 (1983) (finding that the federal government has occupied the field of nuclear
safety concerns).
150. Id. at 212.
151. Cf Thomas L. Gais et al., Implementation of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996,
in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 38 (Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001) (surveying state
experiences in the implementation of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families).
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clients in exchange for state accountability to financial penalties and
bonuses attached to program goals."'' 2 Far from occupying the field of
welfare law, Congress created a broad framework within which states are
expected to legislate.
With respect to the field of antidiscrimination employment law, although the
federal government has passed important pieces of antidiscrimination law that
apply to employers, the states retain authority to regulate employment within
their borders. 5 3 Specifically, the charitable choice statute preserves a religious
organization's exemption under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'114
However, Congress did not intend for Title VII to occupy the field of
antidiscrimination employment law.155 In fact, the language of Section 1104 of
Title XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 supports the idea of state
supplementation. That section provides that no part of the Act should be
construed to indicate "an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in
which any such title operates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject
matter."' 5 6 Although Section 1104 goes on to provide that the Act may
override state laws "inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any
provision thereof," Congress provided an even narrower preemption inquiry for
Title VII. 17 According to Section 708, Title VII preempts only state laws that
would result in a violation of Title VII.158
In other words, Congress has preserved the states' authority to enact
nondiscrimination laws that provide more protection for employees.' 59 For
example, the Supreme Court upheld state employment laws that provide greater
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (discussing state police power to
regulate employment).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
155. See Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,281 (1987) ("Congress has
explicitly disclaimed any intent categorically to pre-empt state law or to 'occupy the field' of
employment discrimination law.")
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (2000).
157. Id.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2000).
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from
any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of
any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports
to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment
practice under this title.
Id.
159. See Drummonds, supra note 123, at 537-41 (explaining that Title VII is part of a
tradition of shared federal and state regulation of employment standards, and noting that
Congress has set federal standards to be minimums, rather than maximums).
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protection for pregnant workers than Title VII requires.' 60 Additionally, some
states have chosen to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
which is not protected by Title VII. 161 Applying this reasoning to the charitable
choice context, it appears that Section 702 of Title VII does not mandate
religious hiring freedom for religious organizations-it simply states that the
federal prohibitions on religious discrimination do not apply to religious
employers. 162 A state law prohibiting government-funded religious employers
from discriminating on the basis of religion provides additional protection for
employees. In this sense, the state law does not violate Title VII, it
supplements Title VII. Thus, Title VII does not preempt state laws providing
greater protection against religious employment discrimination.
2. Actual Conflict Preemption
Although Congress has not preempted state antidiscrimination law by its
pervasive regulation of the field of employment law, courts will also examine
whether state laws conflict with the charitable choice statute. In Perez v.
Campbell, 163 the Supreme Court stated that "[d]eciding whether a state statute
is in conflict with a federal statute and hence invalid under the Supremacy
160. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 280 (affirming that "Title VI1 does not preempt a state law
that guarantees pregnant women a certain number of pregnancy disability leave days, because
this is neither inconsistent with, nor unlawful under, Title VII").
161. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 151B, § 4(1) (2002) (prohibiting employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation); MmN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2000) (same); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (2001) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(a) (2001) (same). For a
comprehensive list of state employment statutes, see Lupu & TUTTLE, supra note 13, at app. B
(indexing state and local antidiscrimination laws).
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2000) ("This subchapter shall not apply ... to a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.").
163. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (finding that the federal Bankruptcy Act
preempted a provision of Arizona's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act that did not
discharge judgment debts). In Perez, the petitioners sustained a tort damage judgment resulting
from a car crash. Id. at 638. A federal district court discharged in bankruptcy the petitioners'
judgments, including the tort judgment. Id. at 639. Under the Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act, the petitioners were still liable for the tort damages, however, and the state
suspended their drivers' licenses as a result of failure to satisfy the judgment. Id. at 641-42.
The Supreme Court found that while the purpose of the Arizona act was to secure compensation
for motor vehicle accident victims, the state's failure to recognize the discharge ofjudgment in
bankruptcy interfered with one of the primary purposes of the federal Bankruptcy Act-to grant
debtor a new start clear of preexisting debts, including some kinds of tort damages. Id. at 648.
Therefore, the Court decided that the conflict between the laws impermissibly frustrated the
federal scheme and the state law stood preempted. Id. at 651-52.
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Clause is essentially a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of
the two statutes and then determining the constitutional question whether they
are in conflict."'(A If compliance with both the state and federal law would be
physically impossible, the federal law preempts the state law.' 65 In Perez, the
court applied conflict preemption to a situation where compliance with both
statues was logically impossible. 66 In that case, the state statute required an
uninsured negligent driver to pay tort damages and withheld driving privileges
until the driver satisfied the judgment.' 67 The state law specifically noted that
the obligation to pay damages could not be discharged in bankruptcy,
1 68
contrary to the federal Bankruptcy Act, which granted debtors a broad
discharge from tort damages. 169 The Supreme Court found that the state law
conflicted with the federal statute's broad discharge for debtors and thus
concluded that the Bankruptcy Act preempted the state law.'
70
Applying the Perez reasoning to 42 U.S.C. Section 604a, if the charitable
choice provisions imply that religious organizations do not have to comply with
laws restricting their hiring freedom, contrary state nondiscrimination laws
would be preempted due to actual conflict with the federal statute. The relevant
provisions of the charitable choice statute are the subsections outlining
charitable choice's purpose 17' and the safeguards for religious character and
164. Id. at 644.
165. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991) (discussing "[t]he
ways in which federal law may pre-empt state law").
166. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 651-52 (noting that the state statute would effectively nullify
the federal law).
167. Id. at 641-43.
168. See id. at 641-42 (quoting the provision of the Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act: "A discharge in bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment
shall not relieve the judgment debtor from any of the requirements of this article").
169. See id. at 648 ("This Court on numerous occasions has stated that 'one of the primary
purposes of the bankruptcy act' is to give debtors 'a new opportunity in life and a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt."').
170. See id. at 656 (finding the Arizona Safety Responsibility Act constitutionally invalid);
see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n., 461 U.S.
190, 216 n.28 (1983) (distinguishing present case from Perez because Perez involved an actual
conflict). Perez illustrates the questionable usefulness of labeling preemption doctrines. The
Court in Perez focused on the fact that the state statute frustrates the purpose of the federal
statute, which sounds like obstacle conflict analysis. See Perez 402 U.S. at 651-52 ("We can no
longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine. .. that state law may frustrate the operation of
federal law as long as the state legislature in passing its law had some purpose in mind other
than one of frustration."). In Pacific Gas, however, the Court referred to Perez as an actual
conflict case, noting that the state law was preempted because it operated contrary to the
provisions of the federal Bankruptcy Act. Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 216 n.28.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) (2000).
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freedom. 7 2 The stated purpose of the federal charitable choice statute "is to
allow States to contract with religious organizations... without impairing the
religious character of such organizations, and without diminishing the religious
freedom of beneficiaries of assistance funded under [charitable choice
programs]."' 73  The statute safeguards the religious character of the
organizations by providing that a religious organization with a charitable choice
contract "shall retain its independence from Federal, State and local
governments, including such organization's control over the definition,
development, practice, and expression of its religious beliefs."' 74 The statute
further provides that a religious organization shall not be required by either a
state or the federal government to "alter its form of internal governance" to
receive funding.
7 5
Proponents of preemption believe these charitable choice sections
demonstrate Congress's intent to preempt state employment or procurement
laws that would inhibit religious hiring freedom.176 According to the Christian
Legal Society's (CLS) construction of the statute, the provision that religious
organizations retain independence from state and local governments over the
definition and development of their religious beliefs includes the implied right
to discriminate in hiring if the organization "has a sincere religious belief
concerning religious staffing."'177 Additionally, CLS argues that the provision
stating that religious organizations need not alter their "internal governance"
must refer to the organization's employment practices regarding "officers and
other key personnel.' 7 The CLS reading of the statue thus construes an actual
conflict between the 42 U.S.C. Section 604a and state laws that would restrict
religious hiring freedom for organizations receiving funds under charitable
choice. 
179
172. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d) (2000).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) (2000).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d)(l) (2000).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d)(2)(A) (2000).
176. C-musTiAN LEGAL SOC'V, supra note 38, at 3 (asserting that subsections (b), (d)(l),
and (d)(2)(A) of the charitable choice statute, 42 U.S.C. § 604a, reflect the congressional
purpose to override conflicting state laws).
177. Id.
178. !d. at 2.
179. Id. at 3 ("If [subsections (b), (d)(1), and (d)(2)(A)] did not preempt conflicting
procurement laws, the language seemingly would have little or no effect."). The Christian Legal
Society does not use the term "actual conflict" and does not apply any preemption cases in its
analysis; it simply reads the charitable choice statute to preempt state law because it would be
impossible for the charitable choice statute to operate otherwise. Id. This seems analogous to
physical impossibility or actual conflict.
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Although the CLS reading of the statute is plausible, the language of the
statute is more ambiguous than the CLS analysis suggests. First, the charitable
choice statute provides that religious organizations are not required to alter their
"internal governance,"'' 80 but the statute does not define this phrase. Congress
may have been referring to the religious organization's governing board rather
than its employees-the statute is not clear on this point. Additionally, though
charitable choice preserves a religious organization's independence from state
and local government, including control over "the definition, development,
practice, and expression of its religious beliefs,"' the term "religious beliefs"
appears to limit this grant of independence. Arguably, religious organizations
do not define or express their religious beliefs when they offer secular social
services funded by charitable choice.
For insight on this point, return to the Supreme Court's opinion in
Amos. 182 Amos is not controlling in the preemption context, but the decision
sheds some light on how a court might interpret a religious organization's right
to define its religious beliefs. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan
agreed with the majority's decision to apply the Title VII religious employer
exemption to the seemingly secular nonprofit activities of the Latter Day Saints
Church, but his justification for the exemption rested on the fact that it would
be too difficult for courts to distinguish between the religious and nonreligious
activities of a religious organization. 8 3 Ideally, religious organizations should
be permitted "to discriminate on the basis of religion only with respect to
religious activities, so that a determination should be made in each case
whether an activity is religious or secular." 8 4 In Brennan's opinion, "the
infringement on religious liberty that results from conditioning performance of
secular activity upon religious belief cannot be defended as necessary for the
community's self-definition."'
185
Although Brennan believed that religious discrimination in employment
should be limited to religious activities, he recognized that the autonomy of
religious organizations required courts to refrain from evaluating the religious
character of their activities on a case-by-case basis.8 6  The problem of
180. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d)(2) (2000).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d)(1) (2000).
182. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
opinion in Amos).
183. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 340 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 343 (Brennan, J., concurring).
185. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 345 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that the nature of the religious
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characterizing the nature of the activity as religious or secular served as the
primary justification for a categorical exemption for religious nonprofit
organizations. The categorical exemption allows courts to avoid excessive
entanglement and relieves religious organizations from trying to anticipate
whether a court would consider its activities religious or secular.1
87
a. Direct Funding
The charitable choice statute, however, addresses Brennan's concern in
Amos by delineating how religious organizations receiving direct government
funding may use the money. Section 604a (0) expressly prohibits organizations
that receive direct government, funds from spending the funds on "sectarian
worship, instruction, or proselytization."' 188 These prohibitions should reduce
ambiguities about the religious nature of an organization's activity. To receive
direct government funds, the religious organization must provide "inherently
secular" social services. 89
The charitable choice prohibitions against direct expenditures of
government funds on religious instruction require religious organizations to
assess the religious nature of their social service programs. The organizations,
rather than the courts, bear the responsibility of characterizing their nonprofit
activities as religious or secular. This separation should ameliorate concerns
about excessive entanglement. The distinction between religious and secular
activities also weakens the Christian Legal Society's broad construction of a
religious organization's right to define, practice, and develop its religious
beliefs through its employment decisions. 9° For example, a faith-based
organization's activity is not always self-evident).
187. Id. at 345-46 (Brennan, J., concurring).
188. 42 U.S.C. 604a(j) (2000).
189. The White House Faith-Based and Community Initiatives created a handbook for
faith-based organizations that supports this interpretation of the separation between religious
and secular activities. See WHITE HOUSE FAITH-BASED AND COMTY. INITIATIVES, GUIDANCE TO
FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 10 1, at 10. The handbook states,
"Basically ... you can not [sic] use any part of a direct Federal grant to fund religious worship,
instruction, or proselytization. Instead organizations may use government money only to
support the non-religious social services that they provide." Id. (emphasis added). "Therefore,"
the handbook advises, "faith-based organizations that receive direct governmental funds should
take steps to separate, in time or location, their inherently religious activities from the
government-funded services that they offer." Id.
190. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Christian Legal
Society argument that the statutory provisions protection an organization's right to define its
religious beliefs conflicts with restrictions on hiring freedom).
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organization operating a government-funded soup kitchen is providing a secular
service. Even if some of the organization's employees view their work as
fulfilling a religious duty or advancing the organization's religious mission, the
service it provides is not inherently religious-assuming the employees are not
providing spiritual instruction along with the soup. In most direct funding
cases, it will be clear that the religious service provider does not need to
discriminate on the basis of religion to effectively carry out its secular program.
Therefore, state nondiscrimination laws would not actually conflict with the
charitable choice statutory grant of religious autonomy to faith-based service
providers.
b. Indirect Funding
Charitable choice's prohibition on proselytization and religious instruction
applies only to organizations that receive direct government funds.' 9' Some
religious service providers receive charitable choice funds only through indirect
channels such as vouchers. 92 For these service providers, the primary restraint
on the religious content of their programs, at the federal level, 193 is the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution. 94  The Supreme Court has
interpreted the Establishment Clause to allow broad freedom for religious
expression, regardless of government funding.'" Thus, faith-based
organizations receiving only indirect funding have more flexibility in designing
the spiritual content of their programs.
In a recent charitable choice case, Freedom from Religion Foundation v.
McCallum, 196 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
191. See 42 U.S.C. § 604ao) (2000) ("No funds provided directly to institutions or
organizations to provide services and administer programs under subsection (a)(l)(A) of this
section shall be expended for sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytization.").
192. See Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at
Government Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J.L. & POL. 539, 575 (2002)
(discussing methods of direct and indirect funding, including vouchers).
193. State versions of the Establishment Clause present different obstacles to faith-based
service providers. See supra note 143 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 604a (k) savings clause and
Locke v. Davey).
194. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion .... ").
195. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,662-63 (2002) (upholding tax-
funded vouchers for religious schools); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995) (requiring state university to allow student newspaper with a
religious viewpoint the same access to printing subsidies as other student groups).
196. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003).
1468
FAITH AND FEDERALISM
followed the Supreme Court's lead and concluded that Wisconsin did not
violate the Establishment Clause when it provided indirect funding to an
inherently religious addiction recovery program.197  Under Wisconsin's
program, a convicted criminal who violated his parole or probation could, as an
alternative to returning to prison, choose to enroll in one of the several halfway
houses authorized by the state.198 The state's list of halfway houses included
Faith Works, a Christian rehabilitation program.199 Parole officers who
recommended Faith Works to parolees were required to explain that the
program had a significant religious component.2° Parole officers also informed
parolees that they were free to choose a secular alternative. 20' For every parolee
who enrolled in Faith Works, the state reimbursed the program for an amount
specified in its contract. 20 2 The plaintiff taxpayers argued that the state's
funding arrangement with Faith Works constituted a violation of the
203Establishment Clause of the Constitution.
At trial, Faith Works emphasized the secular nature of Faith Work's
program and argued that it could separate the religious aspects of its program
204from the secular components. The district court rejected the argument and
noted that Faith Works won the state contract because of its "unique long-term,
faith-based approach. 20 0 The district court would not permit Faith Works to
disavow its inherently religious character, but it concluded that the religious
components of Faith Works did not affect the program's eligibility for state
funding. 20 6 The district court reasoned "simply because a state-funded program
engages in indoctrination does not mean that the program's funding is
unconstitutional. 
2 07
197. Id. at 882.
198. Id. at 881.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 882.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 881.
204. See Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950,968-70 (W.D.
Wis. 2002) (outlining the argument that Faith Works is not a pervasively religious
organization).
205. See id. at 969-70 (stating that "Faith Works cannot now try to excise religion from its
offerings, saying that it contracted with the state to provide the wholly secular services of room
and board without any reference to religion. This assertion rings hollow in light of the literature
Faith Works provided the state.").
206. Id. at 970.
207. Id.
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Instead of focusing on the religious nature of the program, both the district
court and the Seventh Circuit scrutinized the state's contractual relationship
with Faith Works. 20 The courts agreed that the state's practice of reimbursing
Faith Works for each parolee who voluntarily enrolled in the program was
effectively the same as providing vouchers to the parolees-the state simply
skipped the intermediate step of putting the voucher in the hands of the
parolee.2°9 Judge Posner analogized Wisconsin's indirect funding of Faith
Works with state voucher programs that fund parochial schools, a practice that
the Supreme Court has upheld under the Establishment Clause.210
If McCallum reflects a sound application of Establishment Clause
principles,21' it may stand for a narrow situation in which charitable choice
provisions preempt state nondiscrimination employment laws. The Christian
Legal Society argument for actual conflict preemption becomes more
persuasive in the indirect funding context because the Section 604a(j)
constraints on proselytization and religious teaching no longer apply.
212
Without statutory restrictions on religious expression, the provisions in
charitable choice protecting the religious organization's right to define,
develop, and practice its religious beliefs could conflict with state laws that
deny religious organizations the right to make religiously motivated hiring
decisions.
The preemption question did not arise in McCallum because Wisconsin
law expressly states that government social service funding does not affect a
religious organization's freedom to make employment decisions based on
religion.21 3 Imagine that Wisconsin had a law forbidding any organization
receiving state funds from discriminating on the basis of religion in
employment decisions. If the state law applied to Faith Works, the results
208. Id.; see McCallum, 324 F.3d at 882 (comparing state reimbursement to Faith Works
with school vouchers).
209. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 970; McCallum, 324 F.3d at 882.
210. McCallum, 324 F.3d at 882.
211. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Locke v. Davey suggests that the Court will
continue to recognize a constitutionally significant distinction between direct and indirect
funding of religious training. See Locke v. Davey, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 1311-12 (2004) (applying
the Establishment Clause to state scholarships for students pursuing ministerial careers). Justice
Kennedy noted, "Under our Establishment Clause precedent, the link between government
funds and religious training is broken by the independent and private choice of recipients." Id.
at 1311.
212. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(j) (2000) (limiting the use of funds directly provided to
religious organizations).
213. See WIS. STAT. § 46.027(5) (2000) (providing that the religious exemption under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e is not affected by receipt of government funds for social service programs).
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would be illogical. The federal charitable choice provisions protect Faith
Works's independence from state laws affecting its "control over the definition,
development, practice and expression of its religious beliefs." 114 The entire
Faith Works program is infused with the organization's Christian beliefs, and
the organization expects its employees to proselytize and offer spiritual
guidance to program participants on an as-needed basis. 2Is Faith Works could
not carry out these aspects of its program if the state nondiscrimination law
prohibited it from assembling a Christian staff.21 6 In other words, Faith Works
has a legitimate need to make hiring decisions based on religious criteria to
"define, develop, and practice" the organization's religious beliefs.2" 7
According to the doctrine of conflict preemption, the federal charitable choice
laws would displace the conflicting state law. This preemption is narrow,
however, and would only apply to an organization such as Faith Works that
receives indirect funding and demonstrates a concrete need to define, develop,
practice, and express its religious beliefs through its employment decisions.
3. Obstacle Conflict Preemption
If no actual conflict exists between the charitable choice statute and the
state nondiscrimination law, courts will ask whether the state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. 218 Because the obstacle conflict doctrine requires
courts to "consider the relationship between state and federal laws as they are
interpreted and applied, not merely as they are written,, 21 9 courts evaluating a
preemption challenge will look at the express purposes of the statutes and at
how the laws operate in practice.
214. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d)(I) (safeguarding the religious character of religious
organizations).
215. See Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 973 (W.D.
Wis. 2002) (describing duties of Faith Works staff).
216. See id. (same).
217. See id (same). The time the employees spent on secular service could not be
distinguished from the time they spent providing religious instruction because Faith Works
expected its staff to serve as spiritual mentors on an as-needed basis. Id.
218. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (applying this standard to a
Pennsylvania statute); see also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 882 (2000)
(deciding that federal agency objectives preempted state tort law regulating airbags because state
imposition of liability imposes an obstacle to the federal goal of gradually phasing in airbags).
219. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,526 (1977) (finding that state packaging
laws prevented the objectives of the federal Fair Packaging and Labeling Act).
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According to Section 604a(b), the purpose of the charitable choice statute
is to allow religious organizations to compete for government contracts without
"impairing their religious character. 220 The statute does not formally define
"religious character," but the Supreme Court's decision in Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., Inc. 221 indicates that the Court is willing to rely on
information extrinsic to the statute to better understand the federal objective.222
In Geier, the plaintiff sued American Honda under District of Columbia tort
law claiming that Honda had negligently manufactured the plaintiff's car
because it did not include a driver's side airbag.223 The federal regulation in
question was a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) promulgated
by the Department of Transportation under the authority of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.224 The FMVSS required auto
manufacturers to equip some, but not all, of their 1987 vehicles with passive
restraints. 25 The plaintiff characterized the federal safety standard as a
minimum requirement meant to encourage the auto industry to install more
airbags.226 The Supreme Court, however, looked to the history of the safety
standard and determined that the Department of Transportation had considered
the effect a passive restraint requirement would have on the auto industry and
public before the agency decided to impose gradual implementation.227 The
Department of Transportation experimented with different requirements for the
auto industry to implement passive restraint technology.228 Devices such as
ignition locks were unpopular with the public, however, and airbags were
especially expensive and posed safety risks to small women and children.
Based on these findings, the Department of Transportation concluded that a
step-wise requirement would give manufacturers more time to improve passive
restraint technology while allowing the public to warm up to the idea of passive
restraints, thus reducing the backlash that an expensive mandatory requirement
would likely produce.229 After considering the Department of Transportation's
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) (2000) (stating the purpose of the charitable choice section).
221. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
222. See id. at 883 (relying on contemporaneous reports in the Federal Register to deduce
the Department of Transportation's objectives when adopting its standards for requiring auto
manufacturers to install passive restraints).
223. Id. at 865.
224. Id. at 864.
225. Id. at 864-865.
226. Id. at 874.





explanation, the Court decided that FMVSS 208 reflected the agency's intent to
gradually develop passive restraint devices for "safety-related" reasons, and,
thus, FMVSS 208 preempted the state tort law cause of action because it stood
as an "'obstacle' to the accomplishment of that objective." 230 Geier indicates
that the Court will consider extrinsic information both to discern a more
complete picture of Congress's intent and to anticipate the state law's effect on
the overall federal objective.
The reasoning in Geier could have implications for charitable choice if
courts choose to take a comprehensive view of faith-based participation in
social welfare programs. Empirically, religious hiring freedom appears to be an
important element of increasing the role of religious organizations in the
delivery of government-funded social services. 231 In a survey of four hundred
faith-based organizations participating in government contracts, sixty-seven
percent of participants reported that being able to exercise religious hiring
preferences was "very" or "somewhat" important to them.232 Significantly,
eighty-nine percent of "fully expressive" faith-based organizations said that the
religious hiring preference was somewhat/very important, as did seventy-three
percent of congregations and seventy-one percent of new participants.233 Thus,
the survey results indicate that the hiring exemption is most important to the
contractors who began contracting with the government after Congress enacted
charitable choice. These organizations are also the most religiously expressive
and, interestingly, appear to be the most aware of charitable choice law and the
most active in trying to comply with the statute.234 Additionally, seventy-five
percent of the faith-based contractors polled indicated that they had plans to
seek other sources of funding if government or local requirements began
threatening the "religious character" of their organizations.235 These survey
results suggest that many faith-based organizations---especially organizations
230. Id. at 886.
231. See GREEN & SHERMAN, supra note 100, at 6 (examining the importance of charitable
choice provisions to different categories of faith-based contractors).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. This may be because congregation and pervasively sectarian organizations are
more conscious of the need to keep government funds separate and prevent their religious
activities from interfering with their government-funded social services. Organizations like
Catholic Charities and Lutheran Social Services-groups that had collaborated with the
government before charitable choice-are probably less self-conscious about the appearance of
misapplying government funds. See supra notes 44-45 (discussing the practices of religious
service providers prior to charitable choice).
235. See GREEN & SHERMAN, supra note 100, at 6 (examining the importance ofcharitable
choice provisions to different categories of faith-based contractors).
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that began participating in government contracts after Congress enacted
charitable choice-value the freedom to base their hiring decision on religious
grounds.
Inspired by the fact that religious organizations value hiring freedom,
some advocates of preemption suggest that state laws that curtail hiring
freedom are an impermissible obstacle to Congress's purpose in enacting
charitable choice.2 36 For example, in his article Charitable Choice and the
Critics, Professor Carl Esbeck argues that state and local nondiscrimination
laws should not apply to faith-based organizations receiving charitable choice
funds because "the federal statutory guarantees in charitable choice that
promise to protect the 'religious character' and 'internal governance' of FBOs
preempt contrary provisions in state and local laws. 2 37 Although Esbeck does
not directly address the preemption doctrines in his argument for why
charitable choice trumps state laws, he makes, in effect, an obstacle-conflict
argument for preemption. Esbeck asserts that if religious organizations are not
permitted to make hiring decisions based on their "sense of mission, then they
will not be able to sustain the impressive record they now have of successfully
helping the poor and needy., 238 If Esbeck's assessment is correct-religious
organizations cannot both comply with nondiscrimination laws and operate
effectively as service providers-then state laws would indeed act as
impermissible stumbling blocks to charitable choice objectives. Surely,
Congress did not intend to protect the "religious character" of faith-based
organizations receiving government funds only to permit state laws to render
the organizations completely ineffective.
There are two flaws, however, in these arguments for obstacle conflict
preemption. First, arguments such as Esbeck's tend to focus solely on how
religious organizations view the right to exercise religious hiring preferences
and thereby lose sight of the fact that congressional intent is the touchstone of
the preemption analysis. 239 It is the federal objective that ultimately determines
whether state laws stand preempted, not the consensus of charitable choice
advocates.
236. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC'Y, supra note 38, at 3 (arguing that state
nondiscrimination laws interfere with the purpose of charitable choice); Esbeck, supra note 28,
at 20-21 (same). These commentators do not make formal "obstacle conflict doctrine"
arguments because they do not address preemption jurisprudence-their analyses are based on
logical arguments about how the laws would operate. This Note uses the underlying rationale of
their justifications for preemption to anticipate how the arguments would fare under the
preemption doctrines the Supreme Court traditionally applies.
237. See Esbeck, supra note 28, at 20-21 (same).
238. Id. at 21.
239. See supra Part I1I.B (discussing congressional intent).
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In Geier, the Supreme Court's most expansive application of the obstacle-
conflict doctrine to date,240 the Court considered the empirical findings about
public reaction to the passive restraint devices because the evidence influenced
the agency's decision to enact a gradual implementation requirement. 241 In
contrast, there is no indication that Congress considered the value of religious
hiring freedom to faith-based service providers when it enacted the 1996
242charitable choice provisions. Though relevant to a policy discussion,
empirical evidence indicating that faith-based organizations value hiring
freedom does not carry legal significance in the preemption analysis, unless the
state laws restricting hiring freedom would actually interfere with the
fulfillment of Congress's purpose in enacting charitable choice.
This point leads to the second flaw with the obstacle preemption
argument: the arguments advanced by proponents of preemption assume that
the purpose of charitable choice is to remove all legal barriers that might deter
faith-based participation in government services.243 For example, the Christian
Legal Society asserts that if state nondiscrimination laws applied to faith-based
service providers, "[tlhe consequence would be that the all-out attempt to draw
[faith-based organizations] into the nation's effort to make welfare delivery
more effective and efficient would fail. ',244 Although it is clear that President
Bush's Faith-Based Initiative seeks to expand faith-based participation in social
service contracts, his strong push for more participation began five years after
Congress passed the charitable choice provisions in the Welfare Reform Act.245
The more salient questions for the preemption inquiry address Congress's
intent when it initially passed the legislation.246 Did Congress intend to boost
overall participation by religious groups at all costs? Or did Congress intend
240. See Davis, supra note 131, at 1012 (claiming that "Geier represents a seismic shift in
the Court's preemption doctrine").
241. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 875-81 (2000) (examining
Department of Transportation's study of the effects of passive restraint devices on the public).
242. See CANADA & ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 52-53 (commenting on the lack of
legislative history addressing charitable choice prior to the 107th Congress).
243. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN LEGAL Soc'Y, supra note 38, at 2-3 (arguing that the
consequence of allowing states to restrict religious hiring freedom would be an obstacle to the
purposes of charitable choice).
244. Id. at 3.
245. See supra Part II.A (discussing the Faith-Based Initiative).
246. See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994) (stating that
"[w]hether federal law pre-empts a state law establishing a cause of action is a question of
congressional intent"); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,604 (1991) (stating that
"[t]he ways in which federal law may pre-empt state law are well established and in the first
instance turn on congressional intent").
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merely to prevent states from discriminating against faith-based applicants for
government service contracts?
247
Because the language of the statute allows room for debate,2 48 courts will
249likely turn to legislative history to discern Congress's purpose.
Unfortunately, legislative history for the 1996 charitable choice statute does not
provide any additional information about Congress's intent when it enacted
charitable choice. 250  No congressional committee meeting addressed the
charitable choice provisions, much less the state law preemption
implications.25' In light of the current buzz over charitable choice and the
employment question, the lack of attention to its initial enactment appears
strange. Congress's silence appears less mystifying, however, when one
considers that the 1996 charitable choice provisions constituted a comparatively
miniscule subchapter in the massive legislative overhaul of the welfare
system.252
247. Cf Lupu & TurrLE,supra note 13, at 49 (noting that the "overall purpose of Charitable
Choice legislation... is to end categorical discrimination against [faith-based organizations] in the
award of such contracts").
248. 42 U.S.C. 604a(b) (2000) (outlining purpose of the statute). According to the statute:
The purpose of this section is to allow States to contract with religious organizations,
or to allow religious organizations to accept certificates, vouchers, or other forms of
disbursement under any program described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, on the
same basis as any other nongovernmental provider without impairing the religious
character of such organizations, and without diminishing the religious freedom of
beneficiaries of assistance funded under such program.
Id.
249. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,610 n.4 (1991) (relying on legislative
history to aid in interpreting the language of the statute and congressional intent). The court
defended its resort to legislative history:
As for the propriety of using legislative history at all, common sense suggests that
inquiry benefits from reviewing additional information rather than ignoring it....
Legislative history materials are not generally so misleading that jurists should never
employ them in a good-faith effort to discern legislative intent. Our precedents
demonstrate that the Court's practice of utilizing legislative history reaches well into
its past.... We suspect that the practice will likewise reach well into the future.
Id.
250. See CANADA& ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 52-53(2003) (commenting on the lack of
legislative history addressing charitable choice prior to the 107th Congress).
251. Id.
252. See Ron Haskins & Rebecca M. Blank, Welfare Reform: An Agenda for
Reauthorization, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 3 (Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001)
(describing the passage of the 1996 welfare reform legislation). "On August 22, 1996, President
Bill Clinton signed a revolutionary welfare reform bill crafted in Congress over the previous
eighteen months.... Everyone agreed that the law constituted a major break with the past, although
there was substantial disagreement about whether these changes were for the better." Id.
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Congress passed legislation extending charitable choice provisions to
other federal programs during Clinton's presidency, but none of these measures
generated useful legislative history.253 President Bush's Faith-Based Initiative
brought the latent divisions over government funding of religious organizations
to light, both in the media and on the floor of Congress. The legislative history
of the House Charitable Choice Act of 2001 and the Senate CARE Act reveal
that it is impossible to articulate a congressional objective regarding the role of
faith-based organizations in the delivery of government social services.
254
Recent legislative activity indicates that the House is willing to pass strong
charitable choice laws aimed at expanding the role of faith-based organizations
as service providers.25 Those provisions, however, will not survive in the
Senate. The Senate's scaled-back version of the CARE Act does not seek to
expand charitable choice and instead focuses on tax incentives for charitable
giving.156 Three years after passing the Charitable Choice Act of 2001, House
supporters of charitable choice gave up on advancing the Faith-Based Initiative
through legislation and have agreed not to reintroduce the controversial
provisions when the bill returns from the Senate. 27  Thus, the Senate's
stonewalling of efforts to expand charitable choice suggests that Congress does
not have the same no-holds-barred enthusiasm for charitable choice that the
Bush administration has championed. Absent a congressional objective to
253. See CANADA & ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 52 ("Notwithstanding the enactment of
four charitable choice measures in the 104th, 105th, and 106th Congresses, no congressional
committee had held a hearing on charitable choice prior to the first session of the 107th
Congress."); see also supra Part I.A (discussing the extension of charitable choice provisions to
other federal program areas).
254. In a 1983 preemption case, the Supreme Court considered subsequent legislative
history to better understand Congress's intent in an earlier version of the statute. See Pac. Gas
& Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n., 461 U.S. 190, 220 (1983). In
that case, the more recent legislative history indicated that Congress did not intend to preempt
state law because the Senate deleted language from the House bill that might suggest
preemption. Id. The Court noted, "While we are correctly reluctant to draw inferences from the
failure of Congress to act, it would, in this case, appear improper for us to give a reading to the
Act that Congress considered and rejected." Id.
255. See Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. Title 11 (2001)
(expanding charitable choice provisions, including the hiring exemption, to eight federal areas
of federal social services).
256. CARE Act of 2003, S.272, 108th Cong. (2003).
257. See Rob Boston, Faith-Based Victory! Senate Approves Scaled-back CARE Act
Without Controversial Church-State Provisions-But Other Fights Remain, CHURCH & STATE
May 1, 2003, at 10 (describing compromise over the charitable choice legislation). Senator
Rick Santorum, the sponsor of the CARE bill and an advocate of charitable choice, told the
press, "I would have liked to have gotten the whole enchilada,... but in the United States
Senate this year, you're lucky to get anything, and I'll take anything." Id.
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remove legal barriers in order to increase faith-based social services, state laws
do not pose an impermissible obstacle to the stated purpose of the charitable
choice statute: to allow religious organizations to compete for government
funds while retaining their religious character.
4. Summary of Preemption Analysis
In light of Congress's current division over charitable choice objectives, it
seems artificial to read the ambiguous language of the statute as the "clear and
manifest" intent of Congress to displace state nondiscrimination law. Under the
doctrine of field preemption, it is clear that Congress did not intend for the
charitable choice statute to occupy a field of law to the exclusion of the
states. 258 For directly funded faith-based organizations, the actual conflict
doctrine results in the preservation of state employment laws-the provisions in
charitable choice do not conflict with state employment laws because faith-
based organizations are restricted to providing inherently secular services.2 59
However, the prohibitions on religious activity do not apply to indirectly
funded service providers.26° The recent Seventh Circuit decision in Freedom of
Religion Foundation v. McCallum indicates that the actual conflict doctrine
may lead to the preemption of state nondiscrimination laws as applied to faith-
based organizations that receive indirect funding for pervasively religious social
261service programs. Otherwise, the lack of a clear congressional objective to
increase the participation of religious organizations in government-funded
social programs requires that state nondiscrimination laws remain in effect.
262
IV. Policy Considerations
Congress has the power to preempt state and local laws to further its
charitable choice objectives, but it has not yet done so. This Note offers several
related arguments for why Congress should continue to allow states the
freedom to develop their own laws regulating government funding and
religious hiring rights. First, leaving the question to the states complements the
current structure of the welfare system. The 1996 Welfare Reform Act
258. See supra Part III.B (discussing field preemption).
259. See supra Part I1l.C.2.a (discussing actual conflict for directly funded organizations).
260. See supra Part IlI.C.2.b (discussing indirectly funded faith-based organizations).
261. See supra Part I1l.C.2.b (discussing Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCollam).
262. See supra Part I1I.C.3 (discussing obstacle conflict preemption).
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overhauled the system to give states flexibility in designing programs and
administering funds.263 The devolution of welfare allows states to serve as
laboratories for testing different methods of providing social services.
264
Wisconsin's relationship with Faith Works is one example of a state
experimenting with alternative programs to meet the needs of its disadvantaged
citizens. 265 The general concept of encouraging contracts between the
government and religious service providers produces many questions that
academic discussions can answer only partially: Do religious organizations
have the capacity to deliver professional-quality social services? Will
congregations participating in government programs unintentionally encroach
on the religious freedom of beneficiaries? Do faith-based organizations that
make hiring decisions based on religious grounds have more effective
programs? Less effective programs? The best answers to these questions will
emerge not from abstract debates over charitable choice, but rather from studies
of real programs as states implement them.266 Keeping the welfare decision-
making process largely at the state level allows the nation to yield results from
fifty models of welfare policy, instead of trial and error on a national scale.
The arguments supporting the devolution of welfare control to states also
support state control over employment discrimination laws for government
service providers. Some states may follow Wisconsin's example and encourage
faith-based organizations to participate in government-funded service programs
by expressly allowing them to retain their right to hiring preferences.267 The
state of Georgia, however, has taken steps in the opposite direction. Alan
Yorker's lawsuit against Georgia's Department of Human Resources and
United Methodist Children's Home led the DHR to change its policies. The
agency now prohibits child welfare service providers with state contracts from
practicing religious employment discrimination for nonministerial positions.26
263. Cf Gais, supra note 15 1, at 38 (noting that the welfare system expresses a "theory of
federalism").
264. Justice Brandeis applauded this aspect of our federal system in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932), stating: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiences without risk to the rest of the country." Id.
265. See supra Part lII.C.2.b (discussing Wisconsin's indirect funding of the Faith Works
halfway house).
266. See generally CNAAN, supra note 15 (calling for more social science studies
evaluating the effectiveness of faith-based delivery of social services).
267. See supra Part IlI.C.2.b (discussing Wisconsin's hiring exemption for religious
service providers).
268. See Settlement Agreement with the State of Georgia's Department of Human
Resources, para. 2, http://www.lambdalegal.org (Nov. II, 2003) (outlining provisions of the
settlement agreement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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The contrasting state approaches to religious hiring freedom reflect the states'
different experiences with government funding of faith-based service providers.
The flexibility of state control over discrimination laws will provide more
information about the role religious hiring freedom plays in charitable choice
programs.
Second, state and local governments are in a better position to address
their citizens' particular concerns about government partnerships with religion.
For example, some states and cities have greater concerns about the nexus
between religious hiring preferences and the rights of gay and lesbian
employees. 69 Several lawsuits have challenged the right of religious
organizations to make religiously motivated employment decisions based on
sexual orientation, an unprotected classification under Title VII. 270  A
preemptive congressional mandate permitting religious organizations to hire
only people subscribing to particular religious beliefs would effectively
displace state and local laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. Given the lack of consensus on gay rights at the national level, it
seems prudent to allow states the option to provide more protection to their
citizens. Before choosing to preempt state laws in the name of charitable
choice, Congress should carefully consider the inadvertent effect religious
hiring freedom could have on other forms of discrimination.
Finally, allowing states the freedom to maintain their own
nondiscrimination laws will allow a grassroots response to the more
controversial aspects of charitable choice. A public opinion survey indicates
that a majority of Americans are receptive to the concept of religious
organizations participating in government-funded social services.27' The
survey also indicates, however, that Americans are concerned about specific
aspects of the relationship between the government and religious
organizations.272 Significantly, an overwhelming segment of the surveyed
269. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(1) (2002) (prohibiting employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation); MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2000) (same); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (2001) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(a) (2001) (same). For a
comprehensive list of state employment statutes, see LuPu & TUTrLE, supra note 13, at app. B
(indexing state and local antidiscrimination laws).
270. See, e.g., Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Home for Children, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761
(W.D. Ky. 2001) (challenging religiously-motivated decision to fire employee because of her
sexual orientation); Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 6232, 618 (6th Cir.
2000) (same); Plaintiffs Complaint, supra note 2, at para. 9 (same).
271. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, FAITH-BASED FUNDING
BACKED, BUT CHURCH-STATE DOUBTS ABOUND I (Apr. 10, 2001) ("Three-quarters of Americans
say churches, synagogues and other houses of worship contribute to solving important social
problems.").
272. See id. at 8-9 (describing concerns over government's involvement in religion). The
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population-seventy-eight percent--objected to the idea of allowing religious
organizations that receive government funds to hire only those who share their
religious beliefs.273 Unfortunately, the survey did not test for differences in
opinion based on geography. 74 The results do demonstrate, however, that in
the year 2001 there was no national consensus supporting hiring freedom for
government-funded religious organizations. The legislative deadlock over the
hiring issue in Congress over the intervening years suggests that Americans are
no closer to reaching an agreement on the issue.275 States, therefore, should
have the freedom under the charitable choice laws to ameliorate their
constituents' concerns about government-funded religious discrimination.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Locke v. Davey
2 76
affirms that there is room for different federal and state standards governing
church-state relations. In this 2004 case, the Supreme Court upheld the State of
Washington's policy of denying state-funded Promise Scholarships to students
pursuing devotional theology degrees. 77 The state policy complied with the
Washington State Constitution, which states that "[n]o public money or
property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise
or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.
27 1
The plaintiff, Joshua Davey, was awarded a Promise Scholarship and
enrolled in a private religious college, an eligible school under the state
program, where he intended to pursue a major in theology that would train him
for pastoral ministry.279 When Davey shared his major with the college's
financial aid officer, he learned that he could not use his state scholarship
money while pursuing a devotional theology degree.80 In his subsequent legal
survey results indicated that despite general support for government funding for faith-based
welfare programs, a large sector of the public worries that government will become too involved
with religious organizations (68%); that beneficiaries may be forced to participate in religious
practices (60%); that government funding would interfere with separation between church and
state (52%); that funding might increase religious divisions (48%); and that the religious
programs would not meet the same standards as other government-based programs (47%). Id.
273. Id. at 11. The survey tested several variations of the question and found the negative
response to be relatively consistent. Id.
274. The Pew Research Center analyzed the data to trace response patterns across different
demographics (including income and level of education) and political and religious groups. Id.
at 1.
275. See supra Part II.A and Part IIl.C.3 (discussing legislative debates over charitable
choice initiatives).
276. Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
277. Id. at 1309.
278. See id. at 1312 n.2 (quoting Art. 1 § 1 of the Washington State Constitution).
279. Id. at 1310.
280. Id. at 1311.
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action, Davey argued that the state of Washington's denial of his scholarship on
the basis on his decision to pursue a theology degree violated "the Free
Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment, as
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." 28'
A seven-justice majority of the United States Supreme Court rejected
Davey's constitutional claims.2 2  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist observed that the Establishment Clause of the United States would
have allowed the State of Washington to fund Davey's ministerial education.8 3
In accord with the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause precedent, Rehnquist
explained, "the link between government funds and religious training is broken
by the independent and private choice of recipients. 28 4 Rehnquist went on to
find, however, that the Washington Constitution's firmer stance on govemrnment
funding of religion was permissible under the United States Constitution.28" He
reasoned that "[e]ven though the differently worded Washington Constitution
draws a more stringent line than that drawn by the United States Constitution,
the interest it seeks to further is scarcely novel. In fact, we can think of few
areas in which a State's antiestablishment interests come more into play."
28 6
The majority concluded that the Washington policy advanced a substantial state
interest in not funding the pursuit of "devotional degrees.,
287
The Court's decision in Locke v. Davey may have a considerable effect on
charitable choice and President Bush's Faith-Based Initiative. 288 Thirty-seven
states have constitutional provisions prohibiting the flow of state funds to
religious institutions. 28 9 Further, the 1996 charitable choice statute expressly
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1315.
283. See id. at 1311-12 (evaluating the Promise Scholarship Program under the United
States Constitution).
284. Id. at 1311.
285. Id. at 1313-14.
286. Id. at 1313.
287. Id. at 1315 (emphasizing that that the state allowed scholarships to religious
institutions as long as the student did not pursue a degree in "devotional theology").
288. See The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy, Roundtable Research
Page on Locke v. Davey, at http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org (Dec. 2,2003) (anticipating
the possible impact of Locke v. Davey on President Bush's Faith-Based Initiative) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
289. Id. "Thirty-seven states, including the State of Washington, have constitutional
provisions that explicitly forbid state financing of religious organizations, and ten states have




states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to preempt any provision
of a State constitution or State statute that prohibits or restricts the expenditure
of State funds in or by religious organizations. 090 By upholding the validity of
Washington's constitutional prohibition on government funding of religion, the
Supreme Court signaled that states may be able to choose not to abide by
charitable choice provisions in their administration of government social
service funds.
Regardless of the decision's larger implications for the Faith-Based
Initiative, Locke v. Davey affirms that there is room for states to navigate
between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the United States
Constitution.29' Indeed, the Court noted that Washington had a substantial state
interest in asserting a stronger separation between government funding and
religion than required by the United States Constitution.292 It seems that the
Court may also be receptive to an argument that states have a substantial
interest in separating government funding from employment practices that
discriminate on the basis of religion.
V Conclusion
The right of faith-based organizations to make employment decisions
based on religion is currently at the center of controversy over charitable choice
and the Faith-Based Initiative.' 9' The debate has largely focused on federal
laws, but the Supreme Court's recent decision in Locke v. Davey may draw
attention to state law protections against religious employment
discrimination.294 This Note has demonstrated that, apart from a caveat for
organizations that receive indirect funding, federal charitable choice provisions
do not preempt state employment laws that prohibit religious discrimination.
29
States should, therefore, consider how their current nondiscrimination laws
affect the implementation of charitable choice. Some states may decide that
fully exempting religious organizations from restrictions on hiring freedom is
the best way to implement charitable choice. States retain the authority,
however, to decide that Alan Yorker's experience at the United Methodist
290. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(k) (2000).
291. See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2004) (describing the "room for play in
the joints" between the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment).
292. Id. at 1315.
293. Supra note 61.
294. Supra notes 288-89.
295. See supra Part 11I.B.4 (summarizing preemption analysis).
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Children's Home should not be a necessary outcome of allowing faith-based
organizations to participate in the provision of social services.
Regardless of the stance they adopt, states should communicate with faith-
based service providers to ensure that the organizations understand their rights
and duties as partners with the state.z96 One important step states should take is
to redraft their social service contracts to address the legal issues affecting
religious organizations.297 These contracts should clearly outline the effect that
government funding has on the organization's right to exercise religious hiring
preferences for nonministerial employees. The current confusion over hiring
rights at both the federal and the state levels serves as an unnecessary stumbling
block to faith-based organizations seeking to participate in the delivery of
government-funded social services.298 Communication, not preemption, is the
key to improving valuable partnerships between the government and religious
service providers.
296. Appointing faith-based liaisons to facilitate the administration of funds to religious
organizations is a start, but studies show that more communication is needed. See supra notes
96-97 and accompanying text (discussing GAO report evaluating inconsistencies in charitable
choice implementation, despite the appointment of liaisons and the creation of offices to handle
charitable choice issues).
297. In their 2002 report, Professors Lupu and Tuttle offer a model outlining the faith-
based specific provisions states should include in their contracts. See LuPu & TUTTLE, supra
note 13, at 73-76. In 2003, Lupu and Tuttle's updated report noted that five states now have
faith-based specific contracts: Indiana, Maryland, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and Texas. IRA C.
Lupu & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, STATE OF THE LAW 2003: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW CONCERNING
GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS WITH RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS viii-viv (2003).
298. Cf. WHITE HOUSE FAITH-BASED AND COMTY. INITIATIVES, PROTECTING THE CIVIL
RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY OF FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATION, supra note 103, at 7
(suggesting that the "tangle of laws" governing hiring rights has discouraged many effective
faith-based providers from competing for government funds).
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